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I. INTRODUCTION
The issue of witness competency never arises in an average
criminal trial. In child sexual abuse' trials, however, witness com-
petency is often a central issue. The only eyewitness is usually a
child of tender years, therefore the child's testimony is usually crit-
ical to the state's case against the aleged abuser.2 As one commen-
tator observed, "[i]n abuse cases, the eyewitness testimony of the
youngster involved may be the only direct link between the child
and the offender; any other evidence is generally circumstantial
physical evidence that indicates only that abuse was committed."'
In child sexual abuse trials, as in all criminal trials, there are
two competing interests: the interest of the state to convict guilty
1. This comment uses the term "sexual abuse" as a generic term encompassing allega-
tions of any type of sexual activity with children by adults. This category includes various
crimes: incest, sodomy, indecent liberties, molestation, sexual intercourse with an underaged
child, oral or anal sex, indecent assault and lewd and lascivious acts. For a comprehensive
analysis of what each state defines as criminal sexual activity with children, see Kocen &
Bulkley, Analysis of Criminal Child Sex Offense Statutes, in CHILD SRxUAL ABUSE AND Ts
LAW 1 (J. Bulkley ed. 1984).
2. State v. Gilbert, 109 Wis. 2d 501, 516, 326 N.W.2d 744, 751 (1982).
3. Id. (citing Meyers, When Children Take the Stand, 11:1 STUDENT LAW. 14, 15 (Sept.
1982)).
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sexual abuse offenders, and the interest of the accused to have a
fair trial.4 Unfortunately, in the heat of the sexual abuse allegation,
the need to balance these interests is overlooked. The following
newspaper excerpt is indicative of the devastating effect on one
side of the issue-the parents of an abused child:
A Phoenix man accused of molesting three children-hanging
two of them with a rope from the ceiling-may evade prison be-
cause of the age of a key witness in the case. The victim is only 4
years old.
Fearing that the boy would be barred from testifying in a trial
because of his age, [the prosecutor] struck a deal with the defen-
dant, a man she has termed "dangerous" enough to be "ware-
housed for years and years and years."
..The child's parents .. .are angry. [His mother said:]
"They're ingnoring our kids because they're young .... That's
like saying, 'Ok pervert, go out and molest very young kids be-
cause if they're young enough, they're out of luck.' ""
Although such articles incite indignation and disgust, legal
scholars cannot ignore the competing interest, that of the accused.
An equally devastating incident, reported in a recent Miami news-
paper, illustrates the problem from the perspective of the accused:
4. The Supreme Court of Wyoming recognized this tension in a recent case:
We realize that basing a conviction upon the testimony of a young child presents
a serious problem.
"Two alternative hazards are confronted. On the one hand, in ac-
cepting the testimony of a child there is the danger that she may not
be telling the truth, in which event an innocent man may be con-
victed of crime and suffer the consequences thereof. On the other
(hand], if the child's testimony is not accepted, a man quilty of
crime, and possibly with the potential for more such, will go free. In
this connection, it must be borne in mind that when such an offense
(assaulting and taking indecent liberties upon a child] is committed,
it is done with the greatest possible stealth and secrecy, so that most
often the testimony of the victim, coupled with the type of corrobo-
ration we have here, is the only evidence available upon which to
determine guilt or innocence. The fact that there are difficulties in-
volved should not prevent the processes of justice from
functioning."
Larsen v. State, 686 P.2d 583, 586-87 (Wyo. 1984) (quoting State v. Smith, 16 Utah 2d 374,
376, 401 P.2d 445, 447 (1965) (emphasis added)). See also Comment, Minnesota Develop-
ments: Defendants' Rights in Child Witness Competency Hearings: Establishing Constitu-
tional Procedures for Sexual Abuse Cases, 69 MINN. L. Rav. 1377, 1380-83 (1985).
5. Levinger, The Editor's Page, 40:2 J. Soc. Issucs (1984) (citing The Arizona Republic,
Feb. 19, 1984, at 1).
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David Whiteside can't let the matter rest. For eight months he
was suspected of one of the most heinous of crimes, sexually
abusing his own child. His embittered wife made the accusation
in the midst of a nasty custody fight, and his world fell
apart ...
Ultimately, a child psychiatrist concluded that David Whiteside
did not sexually abuse his son. A social worker assigned to the
case concluded the same thing. Even relatives of his estranged
wife came forward to say that she was making up the accusa-
tions to gain custody. And finally a judge decided that the accu-
sations were hokum. So now the matter might seem finished.
Except no court ever exonerated David Whiteside. No court can;
once the most stumbling and hesitant accusation is made by a
child, even if it is retracted immediately, proof of innocence can
never be complete. e
Recently, courts and legislatures have been easing the tradi-
tional rules of evidence in child sexual abuse cases.7 When examin-
ing the propriety of these actions, it is important to remember the
6. Dorschner, A Question of Innocence, Miami Herald, July 28, 1985 (Tropic Maga-
zine), at 11, col. 2. The custody battle situation presents a particularly tragic example of the
inherent dangers when a young child testifies. One of the more potent weapons in a custody
fight against an ex-spouse is an allegation of abuse according to Lesley Wimberly, cofounder
of the California chapter of VOCAL (Victims of Child Abuse Legislation). The Youngest
Witness: Is there a 'witch hunt' mentality in sex-abuse cases?, NEwswEEK, Feb. 18, 1985, at
72, 73. The prospect of having a very young child testify against one parent when the other
parent claims sexual abuse presents problems in addition to the problems encountered in
the average sexual abuse case. In discussing the propriety of a young child testifying as to its
preference for custodial parent, an emotionally similar situation, two commentators ex-
pressed concern that a parent can manipulate the child. "Often one parent, usually the one
with present custody, attempts to coach or counsel the child as to its choice. These tactics
can sometimes be proved by direct evidence; however, more frequently the pressure has
been applied subtly over a period of time .... " Siegel & Hurley, The Role of the Child's
Preference in Custody Proceedings, 11 FAt L.Q. 1, 15 (1977). Although, the custody battle
abuse allegation situation is frightening, the solution is not to find the child incompetent to
testify as a bright line rule. A better result would be to emphasize the investigative process
and to discover the manipulation prior to trial. Howson, Child Sexual Abuse Coses: Danger-
ous Trends and Possible Solutions, CHAMPION, Aug. 1985, at 6, 11.
7. State v. Melendez, 135 Ariz. 390, 661 P.2d 654 (Ct. App. 1983); Note, Child Molesta-
tion Admissibility and Competency, 8 J. Juv. L. 448 (1984); Comment, Liberalization in the
Admissibility of Evidence in Child Abuse and Child Molestation Cases, 7 J. Juv. L 205
(1983); see, e.g., Testimony of Victims of Child Abuse, Pub. Act 85-587, § 2, 1985 Conn.
Legis. Serv. 463 (West) (abandoning competency requirements for child victims of sexual
abuse); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.060(2) (Vernon Supp. 1985) (abandoning competency require-
ments for child victims of certain sex crimes); UTAH COos ANN. § 76-5-410 (Supp. 1985)
(abandoning competency requirements for child victims under the age of ten of sexual
abuse).
1985]
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two competing interests. Responding to criticism from the general
public and from social scientists, courts and legislatures have re-
vised the old practices for determining the competency of very
young witnesses. For example, one critic said,
Perhaps the most controversial law applying to child witnesses
is the requirement that their competence to testify be demon-
strated. . . .Questions have been raised about the wisdom of
competency examinations. The practice could easily lead to a
situation in which the same child would be deemed competent
by one judge but incompetent by another. Furthermore, one
must ask whether a judge can accurately ascertain the potential
accuracy of a child's testimony.
This comment will analyze the historical roots of the child
competency requirement. It will explain the current statutory
treatment of the competency requirement, and the judicial appli-
cation of the statutory requirements. Finally, it will explore pro-
posed resolutions to the competency problem and will suggest
some additional resolutions that would avoid the need to eliminate
the competency requirement.
IL. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Early canon law excluded all witnesses under the age of pu-
berty.* Common law rejected this view. One of the earliest cases to
raise the issue of child competency was The King v. Braiser,10 a
1779 English child sexual abuse case. The defendant in Braiser was
convicted of assault with attempt to commit rape on a child of less
than seven years. 1 The child did not testify at the trial. Her
mother and another woman did testify as to out of court state-
ments the child made upon recognizing her assailant the day after
S. Goodman, Children's Testimony in Historical Perspective, 40:2 J. Soc. IssUEs 12,
14 (1984). As Professor Goodman feared, in at least one reported case, two judges reached
opposite conclusions, but the result does not totally support her charge. In People v. Edgar,
the examining magistrate, in a preliminary hearing for a sexual abuse case, found the four-
year-old child victim competent to testify. 113 Mich. App. 528, 531, 317 N.W.2d 675, 678
(1982). When the case was bound over for trial, the trial court judge ruled that the four-
year-old victim was incompetent to testify because she could not appreciate the obligation
to testify truthfully and understandably, as required by the Michigan Rules of Evidence. Id.
at 632, 317 N.W.2d at 677. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed, holding that once a
judge determines that a witness is competent, "[a) subsequent showing of the witness's in-
ability to testify truthfully affects credibility, not admissibility." Id. at 535, 317 N.W.2d at
67&
9. 4 W. FtmsoN, Rava' HISTORY or THz ENGLISH LAW S0 (1880).
10. 168 Eng. Rep. 202 (1779).
11. Id. at 202.
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the incident.'2 The English court pardoned the defendant because
of the child's failure to testify. 8 The court stated that children are
not automatically disqualified from testifying because of their age.
As the critical gauge of competency to testify, the court singled out
the necessity of understanding the obligation of the oath:
[It is understood that] no testimony whatever can be legally re-
ceived except upon oath; and that an infant, though under the
age of seven years may be sworn in a criminal prosecution, pro-
vided such infant appears, on strict examination by the Court,
to possess a suffient knowledge of the nature and consequences
of an oath ... for there is no precise or fixed rule as to the time
within which infants are excluded from giving evidence; but
their admissibility depends upon the sense and reason they en-
tertain of the danger and impiety of falsehood, which is to be
collected from their answers to questions propounded to them
by the Court; but if they are found incompetent to take an oath,
their testimony cannot be received."
Around the mid-part of the 19th century American courts
adopted the Braiser competency standard. During the next half
century, some states incorporated it into statutes." In 1895, the Su-
preme Court of the United States relied upon Braiser in Wheeler
v. United States." In Wheeler, the defendant was convicted of
murder in Indian territory. The conviction was based partly on the
testimony of the five-year-old son of the murder victim. " The
Court rejected the defendant's contention that the boy was incom-
petent to testify. Like Braiser, the Wheeler Court emphasized the
necessity that the child understand the obligation of the oath. In
addition, however, the Wheeler Court emphasized the child's intel-
lectual capacity:
That the boy was not by reason of his youth, as a matter of law,
absolutely disqualified as a witness is clear. While no one would
think of calling as a witness an infant only two or three years
old, there is no precise age which determines the question of
competency. This depends on the capacity and intelligence of
the child, his appreciation of the difference between truth and
falsehood, as well as his duty to tell the former. The decision of
12. Id.
13. Id. at 201.
14. Id.
15. Note, The Problem of the Child Witness, 10 Wyo. LJ. 214, 215 (1956).
16. 159 U.S. 523 (1895).
17. Id. at 525.
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this question rests primarily with the trial judge, who sees the
proposed witness, notices his manner, his apparent possession or
lack of intelligence, and may resort to any examination which
will tend to disclose his capacity and intelligence, as well as his
understanding of the obligations of an oath.'O
Thus, the early treatment of the competency issue focused on two
criteria-intelligence and capacity to understand the obligation of
the oath.
At early common law, many individuals with personal knowl-
edge of facts of consequence to the litigation were held to be in-
competent to testify.19 For example, the courts disqualified parties,
spouses of parties, and convicted felons because their testimony
was considered self-serving.'0 The courts have long since abolished
these early grounds of incompetency. 1 Each remains, however, as a
ground for impeaching the credibility of a witness.2 Perhaps the
reason for retention of the competency requirement for children is
the courts' unspoken belief that children are inherently unreliable
as witnesses because they tend to mix fact and fantasy.
Two early commentators on competency requirements for chil-
dren expressed the opinion that even if the child's testimony were
admitted, the testimony would be of dubious value. Children, they
said, are limited by immaturity, which too often means that the
child has intermingled imagination with memory.'8 The commen-
tators feared that the child's imprecise statements would be "irre-
trievably engraved on the record by a guileless witness with no
conception that they are incorrect.""12 Today, scholars5 and legisla-
18. Id.
19. M. GRAHAM, EVIDENcE TEXT, RULES ILLUSTRATIONS AND PROBLEMS 30 (1983). The
early rules of exclusion prevented the following classes of persons from testifying (a) those
who by reason of a peculiar religious belief, or lack of any religious belief, were not supposed
to be amenable to the binding force of an oath; (b) parties to the suit; (c) the husband or
wife of a party to the suit; (d) persons pecuniarily interested; (e) naturally incapacitated
persons; and (f) those guilty of certain crimes. J. McKzLvzy, EviDENcE 417 (1924). These
rules substantially disappeared between the years 1823 and 1853. Id.
20. The theory behind disqualification was that from the nature of human passions and
actions there is more reason to distrust such a biased testimony than to believe it. 1 S.
GluNLzy.w LAW OF EVIDENCE § 328 (1899).
21. Id.
22. hi GRAHAM, supra note 19, at 30.
23. Stafford, The Child as A Witness, 37 WASH. L REv. 303, 309 (1962); Comment,
Youth as a Bar to Testimonial Competence, 1953-1954 ARK. L. REv. 100, 105.
24. Stafford, supra note 23, at 309.
25. See, e.g., Berliner & Barbieri, The Testimony of the Child Victim of Sexual As-
sault, 40:2 J. Soc. IssuEs 125, 127 (1984); Cohen & Harnick, The Susceptibility of Child
Witnesses to Suggestion, 4 LAw HUM. BEHAV. 201 (1980); Matin, Holmes, Guth & Kovac,
(Vol. 40:245
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tures e are questioning whether the competency requirements are
valid and whether the requirement should remain in child sexual
abuse cases.
The Federal Rules of Evidence and the 1974 Uniform Rules of
Evidence reflect the more modern viewpoint of the purpose of
competency requirements for children. 7 According to this view-
point, a child is competent to testify, unless it is so bereft of the
The Potential of Children as Eyewitnesses, 3 LAW Hum. BEHAV. 295 (1979); Melton, Chil-
dren's Competency to Testify, 5 LAW Hum. BEHAV. 73 (1981); Melton, Sexually Abused
Children and the Legal System: Some Policy Recommendations, 13 AM. J. FAm. THERAY 61
(1985); Melton, Bulkley & Wulkan, Competency of Children As Witnesses, in CHILD SEx-
UAL ABUSE AND THE LAW 125 (J. Bulkley ed. 1984). For articles discussing the reliability and
suggestibility of children's memories, see Goodman, The Child Witness: An Introduction,
40:2 J. Soc. ISSUES 1 (1984); Goodman, The Child Witness: Conclusions and Future Direc-
tions for Research and Legal Practice, 40:2 J. Soc. IssUES 157 (1984); Goodman, supra note
8; Goodman, Golding & Haith, Juror's Reactions to Child Witnesses, 40(.2 J. Soc. IssUEs 139
(1984); Johnson & Foley, Differentiating Fact from Fantasy: The Reliability of Children's
Memory, 40:2 J. Soc. ISSUES 33 (1984); Loftus & Davies, Distortions in the Memory of Chil-
dren, 40:2 J. Soc. ISSUE 51 (1984).
26. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-90-106 (II) (1973) (deeming victims of child abuse under
age of ten competent to testify if child is able to describe in language appropriate for one
that age the relevant facts); IDAHO CODE § 9-202 (Supp. 1985) (as amended by 1985 Idaho
Sess. Laws ch. 215 § 1, 524) (setting forth explicit requirements for competency hearings);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(f) (West Supp. 1985) (permitting child victims of sexual abuse to
use language appropriate to their age group); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.060 (Vernon Supp. 1985)
(deeming child victims of certain sex crimes under ten years old competent by law); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-5-410 (Supp. 1985) (deeming child victims of certain sex crimes competent
by law if the child is less than ten-years-old); Testimony of Victims of Child Abuse, Pub.
Act 85-587, § 2, 1985 Conn. Legis. Serv. 463 (West) (excepting victims of child abuse from
competency requirements); Judicial Proceedings Involving Children, ch. 85-53 § 3, 1985 Fla.
Sess. Law Serv. 122, 125 (West) (modifying the oath requirement for children: "WHEREAS,
reports of sexual abuse and the commission of unlawful sexual acts against children have
increased dramatically, and . . . a young child is able to relate description of acts involving
sexual contact or sexual acts performed in the child's presence in a reliable manner based
upon considerations of the child's age and development .... " Id. at 123); Victim and Wit-
ness Protection Act, H.F. 462, § 16, 1985 Iowa Legis. Serv. 108, 114 (West) (setting forth
explicit requirements for competency hearings).
27. Rule 601 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and Rule 601 of the 1974 Uniform Rules
of Evidence have the same first sentence: "Every person is competent to be a witness except
as otherwise provided in these rules." FED. R. EVID. 601, 1974 UNIFORM R Evm. 601. The
federal rule includes a second sentence which provides that state competency laws prevail
where state law provides the rule of decision with respect to the element of a claim or de-
fense. FED. R. Evm. 601. It is claimed that the Federal Rules of Evidence eliminated all
competency requirements. See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 8, at 14; Melton, Bulkley &
Wulkan, supra note 25, at 127; Note, The Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prose-
cution: Two Legislative Innovations, 98 HARV. L. REv. 806, 819 n.89 (1985). Nonetheless, the
federal rule still provides that any requirements contained in Rules 602 and 603 must be
met before the witness is competent to testify. M. GRAHAM, supra note 19. See also Larsen
v. State, 686 P.2d 583, 585 (Wyo. 1984) ("The general principle is that a person is compe-
tent if he has a sufficient understanding to receive, remember, and narrate impressions and
is sensible to the obligations of the oath.").
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powers of observation, recordation, recollection, and narration,
that the testimony is untrustworthy and thus lacks relevancy.2"
Federal Rule 601 provides that any requirements contained in
Federal Rules 602 and 603 must be met before the witness is com-
petent to testify. Together, these rules provide the following com-
petency requirements: (1) the witness must have capacity to accu-
rately perceive, record, and recollect impressions of facts (physical
and mental capacity); (2) the witness must in fact have perceived,
recorded, and must be able to recollect impressions of fact having
any tendency to establish a fact of consequence in the litgation
(personal knowledge); (3) the witness must declare that he or she
will tell the truth and be capable of understanding the duty to tell
the truth (oath or affirmation) which requires that the witness be
capable of distinguishing between the truth and a lie or fantasy;
and (4) the witness must be able to express himself clearly, with
the aid of an interpreter if necessary.'0
Rule 601 of the Federal Rules reflects the philosophy that few
persons are inherently incapable of testifying in a useful manner.
The rule also reflects the belief that the trier of fact can consider
matters of mental capacity, interest in the action, prior convic-
tions, and other relevant matters in assessing the credibility of the
witness and the weight to be accorded to the witness's testimony.30
III. STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS
The competency or lack of competency of a child witness is
largely determined by the forum state's statutory requirements.
Therefore, one must understand the various statutory schemes uti-
lized by the states8' before one can understand the disparate treat-
28. M. GRAmAM, supra note 19, at 31; Graham, infra p. 19 (Indicia of Reliability and
Face to Face Confrontation: Emerging Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecution, 40 U.
MLtuj L REv. 19, (1985)).
29. Graham, supra note 28 at 76.
30. D. Lowsma. & C. Mumzuz, FEDERAL EVIENCE § 250 (1979); FED. R Evm. 601 advi-
sory committee note.
31. Seven states have developed competency requirements pursuant to case law and do
not have a specific statute: Connecticut: State v. Martin, 189 Conn. 1, 454 A.2d 256, cert.
denied, 461 U.S. 933 (1983); State v. Brigandi, 186 Conn. 521, 442 A.2d 927 (1982); State v.
Stankowski, 184 Conn. 121, 439 A.2d 918, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1052 (1981); State v. Rodri-
guez, 180 Conn. 382, 429 A.2d 919 (1980); State v. Siberon, 166 Conn. 455, 352 A.2d 285
(1974); State v. Segerberg, 131 Conn. 546, 41 A.2d 101 (1946); State v. Orlando, 115 Conn.
672, 163 A. 256 (1932)); But see Testimony of Victims of Child Abuse, Pub. Act 85-587, § 2,
1985 Conn. Legis. Serv. 463 (West) (victims of child abuse are exempt from any competency
requirement)); Illinois: People v. Garcia, 97 Ill. 2d 58, 454 N.E.2d 274 (1983), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 355 (1984); People v. Marsh, 403 Ill. 81, 85 N.E.2d 715, cert. denied, 338 U.S. 837
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ment given to the issue of competency. Under the current system,
a child may be competent to testify in one state but not in another.
It is because of this disparity that it would be preferable to adopt a
uniform competency statute.
Statutory competency schemes can be roughly divided 31 into
four different categories: (1) Every person is competent to testify if
he or she is capable of understanding the facts about which the
testimony is offered. (2) Every person is competent if he or she can
understand the oath. (3) Every person is competent except as pro-
vided otherwise (the Federal and 1974 Uniform Rules standard).
(4) Every person is competent if he or she understands the obliga-
tion to tell the truth and can be understood by the jury.
(1) Every person is competent to testify if capable of under-
standing the facts about which the testimony is offered. Only two
state statutes have this particular requirement: Massachussets5
and Kentucky. 4 The Kentucky statute provides, "every person is
competent to testify for himself or another, unless he be found by
the court incapable of understanding the facts for which his testi-
mony is offered."8 5
(2) Every person is competent who can understand the oath.
Some of the states in this category use an age level to trigger the
application of the statute.36 The remaining state statutes in this
(1949); People v. Karpovich, 288 I1. 268, 123 N.E. 324 (1919); Featherstone v. People, 194
11. 325, 62 N.E. 684 (1901); Maryland: Johnston v. Federick, 140 Md. 272, 117 A. 768
(1922); Brandau v. Webster, 39 Md. App. 99, 382 A.2d 1103 (1978); see also MD. CTS. & Jun.
PRoc. CODE ANN. § 9-103 (Supp. 1985) (1985 amendment: "In a criminal trial, the age of a
child may not be the reason for precluding a child from testifying.")); New Hampshire:
State v. Perkins, 121 N.H. 713, 435 A.2d 504 (1981); State v. St. John, 120 N.H. 61, 410 A.2d
1126 (1980); Rhode Island: In re Gerald, - R.I. -, 471 A.2d 219 (1984); State v.
Cabral, 122 R.I. 623, 410 A.2d 438 (1980); Pierce v. New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co., 86 R.I. 326,
134 A.2d 421 (1957); South Carolina: State v. Hardee, 279 S.C. 409, 308 S.E.2d 521 (1983);
State v. Lambert, 276 S.C. 398, 279 S.E.2d 364 (1981); State v. Green, 267 S.C. 599, 230
S.E.2d 618 (1976); State v. Givens, 267 S.C. 47, 225 S.E.2d 867 (1976); Payton v. Strickland,
262 S.C. 210, 203 S.E.2d 388 (1974); State v. Abercrombie, 130 S.C. 358, 126 S.E. 142 (1925);
Virginia: Cross v. Commonwealth, 192 Va. 249, 64 S.E.2d 727 (1951); Rogers v. Common-
wealth, 132 Va. 771, 111 S.E. 231 (1922).
32. Accept these categories with the caveat that the categories are "rough."
33. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 233, § 20 (West Supp. 1985) ("[a~ny person of sufficient
understanding"). In Massachusetts, the test of competency of children to testify is not age,
but capacity to understand and communicate, coupled with consciousness of the duty to
speak the truth. Malchanoff v. Truehart, 354 Mass. 118, 236 N.E.2d 89 (1968).
34. Ky. REV. STAT. § 421.200 (1981) ("[Elvery person is competent to testify for himself
or another, unless he be found by the court incapable of understanding the facts concerning
which his testimony is offered.").
35. Id.
36. The following statutes have built-in age triggers: Indiana: IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-
14-5 (Burns Supp. 1985) ("Children under ten [10] years of age [are not competent], unless
1985]
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category have no age trigger.37 The Tennesse statute is typical of
this latter category: "Every person of sufficient capacity to under-
stand the obligation of an oath is competent to be a witness."38
(3) Every person is competent except as provided otherwise
in the rules of evidence. The state statutes or rules in this cate-
gory39 follow either the 1974 Uniform Rules of Evidence or the
it appears that they understand the nature and obligation of an oath."); Louisiana: LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-469 (West 1981) ("(N]o child less than twelve years of age shall, over
the objection either of the district attorney or of the defendant, be sworn as a witness, until
the court is satisfied, after examination, that such child has sufficient understanding to be a
witness."); New York: N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.20 (Consol. 1979) ("A child less than
twelve years old may not testify under oath unless the court is satisfied that he understands
the nature of an oath.").
37. The following statutes have no age trigger: Alabama: ALA. CODE § 12-21-165 (1975)
("[Cihildren who do not understand the nature of an oath, are incompetent witnesses.");
Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 38-1607 (1981) ("Persons who do not have the use of reason, such
as idiots, lunatics during lunacy, and children who do not understand the nature of an oath,
shall be incompetent witnesses."); Iowa: IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.1 (West 1950) ("Every
human being of sufficient capacity to understand the obligation of an oath is a competent
witness in all cases, except as otherwise declared."); (But see Victim and Witness Protection
Act, H.F. 462, § 16, 1985 Iowa Legis. Serv. 108, 114 (West Supp. 1985) (setting forth de-
tailed requirements as to child competency under IOWA R EvID. 601)); Tennessee: TENN.
CODE ANN. 1 24-1-101 (Supp. 1985).
38 TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-101 (Supp. 1985).
39. The following states have competency statutes or rules which fall in this category:
Arkansas: ARu. R Evm. 601 ('Every person is competent to be a witness except as other-
wise provided in these rules."); Delaware: Din.. R EvID. 601 ("Every person is competent
to be a witness except as otherwise provided in these rules."); Florida: FLA. STAT. § 90.601
(1983) ("Every person is competent to be a witness, except as otherwise provided by stat-
ute."); Hawaii- HAWAII R EvmD. 601 ("Every person is competent to be a witness except as
otherwise provided in these rules."); Mississippi- Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-3 (1972) ("Every
person, whether a party to the suit or not, shall be competent to give evidence in any suit at
law or in equity, and shall not be incompetent by reason of any interest in the result thereof
or in the record as an instrument of evidence in other suits.") (Note that the Mississipi
statute is not an adoption of either the Federal Rules of Evidence or the 1974 Uniform
Rules of Evidence, but does reach the same standard. The Mississippi statute has been
interpreted to mean that "the trial judge should satisfy himself that the child has the ability
to perceive and remember events, to understand and answer questions intelligently, and to
comprehend and accept the importance of truthfullness." House v. State, 445 So. 2d 815,
877 (Miss. 1984)); Nebraska: Nza. REv. STAT. § 27-601 (1979) ("Every person is competent
to be a witness except as otherwise provided in these rules."); Nevada: NEv. REv. STAT. §
50.015 (1979) ("Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided in
this Title."); New Jersey: NJ. Rev. STAT. § 2A:81-1 (1976) ("Except as otherwise provided
by statute no person shall be excluded as a witness in any action, proceeding or matter of a
civil or criminal nature, for any of the following reasons: ... [age not included]); New
Mexico: N.M. R EvID. 601 ("Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise
provided in these rules."); North Carolina: N.C. R. EvD. 601 ("Every person is competent
to be a witness except as otherwise provided in these rules."); North Dakota: N.D. R
Evm. 601 ("Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided in these
rules."); Oklahoma: OxLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2601 (1980) ("Every person is competent to be a
witness except as otherwise provided in this Code."); Oregon: O. REv. STAT. § 40.310
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Federal Rules of Evidence. The Arkansas rule is typical of the
rules and statutes within this category. It reads: "Every person is
competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided in these
rules.""0 The words "except as otherwise provided in these rules"
in statutes of this type usually refer to rules of evidence that re-
quire the witness to have personal knowledge and to testify by
oath or affirmation.41
(4) Every person is competent who is capable of being under-
stood by the jury and understands the obligation to tell the truth.
The state statutes and rules' 2 within this category are very de-
(1983) ("Except as provided in ORS 40.310 to 40.340 (pertaining to personal knowledge,
interpreters, and the competency of judges, jurors and attorneys], any person who, having
organs of sense can perceive, and perceiving can make known the perception to others, may
be a witness."); Pennsylvania: 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 5911 (1982) ("Except as otherwise
provided in this subchapter, all persons shall be fully competent witnesses in any criminal
proceeding before any tribunal."); South Dakota: S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 19-14-1
(1979) ("Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided in chapters
19-9 to 19-18 [South Dakota's version of the 1974 Uniform Rules of Evidence], inclusive.");
West Virginia: W. VA. R. EvID. 601 ("Every person is competent to be a witness except as
otherwise provided for by statute or these rules."); Wisconsin: Wis. STAT. § 906.01 (1975)
("Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided by §§ 885.16 and
885.17 [pertaining to the Dead Man's Statute] or as otherwise provided in these rules.");
Wyoming: Wyo. R. Evin. 601 ("Every person is competent to be a witness except as other-
wise provided in these rules.").
40. ARK. R. EviD. 601.
41. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
42. Some of the statutes and rules in this category also use the child's age to trigger the
application of the test for competency, as noted below. See, e.g., Alaska: ALASKA R. EviD.
601; Arizona: ARMZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2202 (1982) (age trigger); California: CAL. Evm.
CODE § 701 (West 1966) (no age trigger); Colorado: COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-90-106 (1973)
(age trigger). But see COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-90-106(11):
This proscription does not apply to ,- child under ten years of age, in any civil or
criminal proceeding for sexual abuse, sexual assault, or incest, when the child is
able to describe or relate in language appropriate for a child of that age the
events or facts respecting which the child is examined.
Id.
A recent commentator believes this amendment does not change Colorado law because
the appellate courts dealing with the issue did not expect the children to use sophisticated
language. Garnett, Children as Witnesses: Competency and Rules Favoring Their Testi-
mony, 12 COLO. LAW. 1982, 1984 (1983). The amendment is important, however, " because it
expresses the strong public sentiment that children victims of sex offenses be taken seri-
ously and that trial courts be particularly thorough and cautious before excluding the testi-
mony of a young child on the ground of incompetency to testify." Id. For additional statutes
which use the child's age to trigger the competency test, see: Idaho: IDAHO CODE § 9-202
(Supp. 1985); Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-417 (1983); Maine: ME. R. Evm. 601; Michi-
gan: MICH. Comp. LAWS § 600.2163 (1968); MIcH. R. EviD. 601 ("Unless the court finds after
questioning a person that he does not have sufficient physical or mental capacity or sense of
obligation to testify truthfully and understandably, every person is competent to be a wit-
ness except as otherwise provided in these rules."); Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. §
595.02(f) (West Supp. 1985). The Minnesota statute specifically provides the following
1985]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
tailed. Most of these statutes were modeled after Rule 17 of the
1953 Uniform Rules of Evidence. 43 Alaska's rule of evidence is typ-
exception:
Persons of unsound mind, persons intoxicated at the time of their production for
examination, and children under ten years of age, if any of them lack capacity to
remember or to relate truthfully facts respecting which they are examined, are
not competent witnesses. A child describing any act of sexual contact or penetra-
tion performed on or with the child by another may use language appropriate for
a child of that age.
According to a recent commentator the 1984 amendment did not change Minnesota law.
"This 1984 amendment has not changed competency hearings in practice because judges
have always expected and accepted children's language from children." Comment, supra
note 4, at 1383-84 n.11. See also Missouri- Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.060(II) (Vernon Supp.
1985) (age trigger). The Missouri statute reads:
A child under ten years of age, who appears incapable of receiving just impres-
sions of the facts respecting which he is examined, or of relating them truly,
provided, however, that except as provided in subdivision (I) (dissallowing wit-
nesses mentally incapacitated at time of production] of this section, a child
under the age of ten who is alleged to be a victim of an offense under sections
566.030 [rape], 566.060 [sodomy], 566.100 [incest], 568.020 (endangering the wel-
fare of a child], 568.050, 568.060 (abuse of a child], 568.080 [child used in sexual
performance], and 568.090 [promoting sexual performance by a child] .. . shall
be considered a competent witness and shall be allowed to testify without quali-
fication in any judicial proceeding involving such alleged offense. The trier of
fact shall be permitted to determine the weight and credibility to be given to the
testimony.
Id. See also Montana: Mo'r. R Evm. 601 (no age trigger); Ohio. Otno REv. COD ANN. §
2317.01 (Page 1981) ("All persons are competent witnesses except those of unsound mind,
and children under ten years of age who appear incapable of receiving just impression of the
facts and transactions respecting which they are examined, or of relating them truly.");
Omo R Evm. 601 ("Every person is competent to be a witness except: (A) Those of unsound
mind, and children under ten (10) years of age, who appear incapable of receiving just im-
pressions of the facts and transactions respecting which they are examined, or of relating
them truly. . . "); Texas: Tam. CRW. PROC. CODs ANN. § 38.06 (Vernon 1979) ("[All per-
sons competent except] (c]hildren or other persons who, after being examined by the court,
appear not to possess sufficient intellect to relate transactions with respect to which they are
interrogated, or who do not understand the obligation of an oath."); Utah. UTAH Cons ANN.
§ 78-24-2 (Supp. 1985) ("Who may not be witnesses.. .(2) Children under ten years of age,
who appear incapable of receiving just impressions of the facts respecting which they are
examined, or of relating them truly.") (But see UTAH COD ANN. § 76-5-410 (Supp. 1985):
"[A) child victim of sexual abuse, under the age of ten, shall be considered a competent
witness and shall be allowed to testify without prior qualification in any judicial proceeding.
The trier of fact shall be permitted to determine the weight and credibility to be given the
testimony."); Vermont: VT. R Evm. 601(b) (no age trigger); Washington: WAsH. Rzv.
CoDE ANN. 1 5.60.050 (1963) (age trigger).
43. Rule 17 of the 1953 Uniform Rules of Evidence states:
DisquaUfication of Witness. Interpreters. A person is disqualified to be a wit-
ness if the judge finds that (a) the proposed witness is incapable of expressing
himself concerning the matter so as to be understood by the judge and jury ei-
ther directly or through interpretation by one who can understand him, or (b)
the proposed witness is incapable of understanding the duty of a witness to tell




ical of this category. It reads:
A person is competent to be a witness unless the court finds that
(1) the proposed witness is incapable of expressing himself con-
cerning the matter so as to be understood by the court and jury
either directly or through interpretation by one who can under-
stand him, or (2) the proposed witness is incapable of under-
standing the duty of a witness to tell the truth."
IV. APPLICATION OF THE DIFFERENT STATUTORY SCHEMES
A. The Substantive Impact
The issue of a child's competency receives different treatment
in different jursidictions. In one jurisdiction, the courts treat the
child's ability to receive accurate impressions of fact as merely in-
dicating the credibility of the witness. In another jurisdiction, the
same ability determines the child's competency to be a witness.
Thus, the inconsistency is more significant than having the same
child found competent by one judge and incompetent by another;4'
the child may be competent in one state and incompetent in
another.
Different rules of laws reflect differing state policies. When the
issue is whether the child victim of sexual abuse is competent to
testify against the alleged perpetrator, however, the inconsistency
in the statutes is too important to be ignored. The statutes must
be examined in light of the state policies behind the statutes. Some
states have complex competency requirements to enforce a public
policy of protecting the defendant's right to a fair trial. In examin-
ing the statutes, one should ask whether the very strict compe-
tency requirements are broader than necessary to achieve their
goal. Some states have lenient competency statutes that appear to
waive competency requirements for child victims in sexual abuse
cases. These statutes further the state public policy of convicting
all guilty parties. Do these lenient statutes achieve their goal, or
are the statutes being abused and used to undermine our system of
justice?
If the function of the competency requirement is to ensure
that only relevant evidence is presented to the jury, then overly
Note, The Problem of the Child Witness, 10 Wyo. L.J. 214, 219 (1956). The 1953 Uniform
Rule in turn was based on Rule 101 of the American Law Institute's 1942 Model Code of
Evidence. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 101 (1942).
44. ALASKA R EVID. 601.
45. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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strict competency statutes may operate to prevent admission of
relevant evidence." Are states with liberal competency require-
ments presenting irrelevant evidence to their jurors? Are states
with stricter requirements keeping potentially relevant evidence
from their jurors? This is not a constitutional requirement, such as
the Miranda rule, which uniformly disqualifies acknowledged rele-
vant information because of the unconstitutional method by which
the evidence was acquired.4 ' The existence in some states of overly
broad competency statutes causes evidence to be inadmissible in
one state, but relevant and admissible in another.
An examination of case law applying the different statutes il-
lustrates this problem. The Wyoming rule of evidence on compe-
tency can be placed in the "every person is competent except as
provided otherwise in the rules of evidence" category. 8 This means
that Wyoming follows the Federal Rules' and the Uniform Rules'
approach to competency. In Larsen v. State," the Supreme Court
of Wyoming formulated Wyoming's requirement under the rule as
follows: "The general principle is that a person is competent if he
has a sufficient understanding to receive, remember, and narrate
impressions and is sensible to the obligations of the oath."50 In
Larsen, the defendant was convicted of taking indecent liberties
with his three and one-half-year-old son.5" The child was five years
old at the time of trial and the trial court found the youngster
competent to testify.53 The Larsen court found the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in finding the child was competent because
the judge had inquired about the child's knowledge, memory, and
awareness of telling the truth.52
In contrast to the standards utilized in Wyoming, Maine has a
rule of evidence which puts it in the "everyone is competent who is
capable of being understood by the jury and understands the obli-
gation to tell the truth" category." In State v. Pinkham, the Su-
46. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
47. Nor is this the situation where relevant evidence is not admitted for policy reasons
as may be the case with prior bad acts or prior crimes testimony. See Comment, supra p.
217 (Other Crimes Evidence to Prove the Corpus Delicti of a Sexual Offense, 40 U. MIrms
L. Rev. 217 (1985)).
48. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
49. 686 P.2d 583 (Wyo. 1984).
50. Id. at 585 (citing 81 AK. Jua. 2d Witnesses § 69).
51. Larsen, 686 P.2d at 584.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 586.
54. MiL R EviD. 601.
55. 411 A.2d 1021 (Me. 1980).
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preme Court of Maine reviewed a trial court finding that an eight-
year-old witness to criminal threatening was competent to testify.
The reviewing court stated that the child's ability to record, recol-
lect, and recount should be part of the jury's assessment of the the
child's testimony but should not affect the child's competency to
testify:
The child need only be able to express herself "so as to be un-
derstood by the judge and jury." Whether he can "receive accu-
rate impressions of facts," "recollect them correctly" and "relate
a true version of the impressions received," are matters going to
the credibility and weight of the testimony but not to her com-
petency to be a witness."
Thus, in two jurisdictions, the highest state courts have
treated the same characteristics (ability to receive accurate impres-
sions of facts and ability to relate facts truthfully) differently. In
Wyoming, the court used these characteristics to determine the
competency of the child witness. In Maine, the court used the
same characteristics to determine not the competency of the child,
but credibility of the child. The Maine child in Pinkham, may not
have passed the Wyoming competency requirements.
This disparate treatment is also reflected in states which have
developed competency requirements solely by case law.' In re
Gerald" sets forth the Supreme Court of Rhode Island's version of
the factors to be considered in determining the competency of a
child witness. The court said the child must be able to: "(1) ob-
serve, (2) recollect, (3) communicate (a capacity to understand
questions and to furnish intelligent answers), and (4) appreciate
the necessity of telling the truth."0 The court in Gerald ultimately
decided that the five-year-old sexual abuse victim was competent
to testify and that the lower court did not abuse its discretion."
The majority of the courts in this country grant the trial judge
discretion in testing the competency of a young witness.6 This
would appear to be the reason that far more cases sustain than
reverse a competency determination of a lower court."
56. Id. at 1023.
57. See supra note 31.
58. - R.I.-, 471 A.2d 219 (1984).
59. Id. at -, 471 A.2d at 221.
60. Id.
61. See generally Note, Evidence, 4 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 455, 468 n.112 (1980) (citing
cases).
62. See infra note 178. Very few cases have reversed a trial court's finding of incompe-
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The appellate case law, however, is not where the statutes
have their strongest impact. The strongest impact is at the trial
level, when a prosecutor is faced with a strict statute and a four-
year-:old witness. Should the prosecutor attempt to put the child
on the stand despite the chance that the judge will find the child
incompetent? A finding of incompetency could very well destroy
the state's case. Without the child witness, the prosecutor would
probably plea bargain with the accused to ensure some type of con-
viction. e In the alternative, as happened in State v. Ryan, a re-
cent Washington case, the prosecutor might stipulate that the
child is "statutorily incompetent" and never bring the child before
the court for a competency determination."
In Ryan, the prosecutor had hearsay statements of two victims
of sexual abuse. One victim was four and one-half years old and
the other was five. A new Washington statute," in effect at the
time of the trial, was supposed to make the hearsay statements
admissible. The prosecutor probably believed that he would save
the children the trauma" of testifying while simultaneously avoid-
ing a finding of incompetency." The defense possibly could have
tency. See, eg., Pace v. State, 157 Ga. App. 442, 278 S.E.2d 90 (1981) (eight-year-old victim
of molestation incompetent to testify based on review of the competency hearing and the
entire testimony); Lanoue v. State, 99 Nev. 305, 661 P.2d 874 (1983) (five.year-old witness
to ten-year-old sister's rape held incompetent to testify on a review of the competency hear-
ing and the entire testimony).
63. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
64. 103 Wash. 2d 165, - 691 P.2d 197, 200 (1984).
65. Id.
6S. WAsH. Rv. Cooe ANN. I 9A.44.120 (Supp. 1984) (enacted in 1982).
67. See generally Libai, The Protection of the Child Victim of a Sexual Offense in the
Criminal Justice System, 15 WAYrN L Ray. 977 (1969) (discussing the trauma a child vic-
tim of sexual abuse faces as a witness).
68. The Supreme Court of Washington also indicated that If the trial court found that
the children were incompetent at the time they made the hearsay statements, the state-
ments would not be admitted. Ryan, 103 Wash. 2d at - 691 P.2d at 203. The court
indicated that res gestae utterances would be an exception to this rule. Id. at - 691 P.2d
at 203-04.
The Washington decision is not as damaging as it appears because even if a court finds
children incompetent when they made the statements, the court may find them competent
at the time of trial and thus competent to testify. "The date of competency or incompetency
of a witness as a witness is fixed as of the time the witness is offered and not the time when
the facts testified to occurred." Knab v. Alden's Irving Park, Inc., 49 Ill. App. 2d 371, 199
N.E.2d 815 (1964); accord State v. Garner, 116 Ariz. 443, 569 P.2d 1341 (1977); Arnold v.
State, 167 Ga. App. 720, 307 S.E.2d 526 (1983); Cross v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 62, 77
S.E.2d 447 (1953).
The court in Ryan determined that the hearsay statements were unreliable because the
children were incompetent at the time they made the hearsay statements. It is not clear
whether the hearsay statements would have been admissible if the children had been pro-
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used a finding of incompetency to discredit the hearsay state-
ments. Under the stipulation, the hearsay statements were admit-
ted because the witnesses were "unavailable." The Supreme Court
of Washington reversed the defendant's conviction holding that in-
troduction of the hearsay statements violated the defendant's right
of confrontation under the sixth amendment." The court found
that under Ohio v. Roberts,7 0 "stipulated incompetency based on
an erroneous understanding of statutory incompetency was too un-
duced at trial and if the judge had found them competent. One commentator has suggested
that "It]he standard for competency as a witness at the event itself may be lower than the
standard for competency to testify." Melton, Children's Competency to Testify, 5 LAw
HUM. BEHAV. 73, 75 n.10 (1981).
Indiana has a statute similar to the Washington statute. IND. CODs ANN. § 35-37-4-
6(c)(2)(B) (Burns Supp. 1984). It also allows admission of hearsay statements of child vic-
tims of sexual abuse. The Indiana statute, however, specifically delineates a finding of in-
competency (due to failure to understand the obligation of the oath) as one of the grounds
of unavailability under which the court may still admit the hearsay statement.
A Kansas appellate court addressed the issue of the admissibility of hearsay statements
of witnesses found to be incompetent after a competency hearing in State v. Pendelton, 10
Kan. App. 2d 26, 690 P.2d 959 (1984). In Pendelton, the defendant was convicted of aggra-
vated indecent solicitation of a child. Id. at _ 690 P.2d at 961. At trial, the judge held a
preliminary hearing to determine the competency of a seven-year-old. Id. The trial court
found the child was incompetent because "it appealed] that on inquiry he (could not] re-
late in a logical progression the sequence of events, or, for that matter, the factual situation
that (gave] rise to the issues of this particular lawsuit." Id. Nevertheless, the court permit-
ted the child's mother to testify as to the child's hearsay statements under a new statutory
hearsay exception, KAN. STAT. ANN. 60-460(dd) (1983) (enacted in 1982). The defendant con-
tended this violated his right of confrontation. The Pendelton court held:
Where a statement is made by a child victim to his parent shortly after the
occurrence of the crime, when the victim is still exhibiting signs of being upset
by the occurrence, at the first opportunity for such communication; the state-
ment is corroborated by other testimony at trial; and the trial judge has an op-
portunity to evaluate the trustworthiness of the child victim in a hearing to de-
termine his unavailability as a witness, we cannot find that the admission of the
statement violates any of (defendant's] constitutional rights.
State v. Pendelton, 10 Kan. App. 2d 26, -, 690 P.2d 959, 965 (1984). See also People v.
Stritzinger, 34 Cal. 3d 505, 668 P.2d 738, 194 Cal Rptr. 431 (1983) (Admission of child
victim's preliminary hearing testimony violated defendant's sixth amendment right to con-
frontation where the only evidence concerning unavailability of the witness was the child's
mother's lay testimony that the child suffered from emotional difficulties. The court indi-
cated that expert testimony as to the child's emotional difficulties may have been
sufficient.).
For additional discussion of this issue, see Graham, supra note 28 and Note, supra note
27, at 817-19. See generally Skoler, New Hearsay Exceptions for Child's Statement of Sex-
ual Abuse, 18 J. MA& L. REv. 1 (1984); Comment, A Comprehensive Approach to Child
Hearsay Statements in Sex Abuse Cases, 83 COLUm. L. Rzv. 1745 (1983); Comment, Con-
fronting Child Victims of Sex Abuse: The Unconstitutionality of The Sexual Abuse Hear-
say Exception, 7 U. PUGET SOUND L Rev. 387 (1984).
69. Ryan, 103 Wash. 2d at -, 691 P.2d at 203.
70. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
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certain a basis to find unavailability."7' Thus the admission of the
hearsay statement violated the defendant's confrontation rights
when hearsay was admitted.7
The problems with application of the substantive competency
requirements at the appellate level are matched at the trial level
by the problems of prosecutors' awareness and understanding of
the strict competency requirements. Every day prosecutors make
decisions that are never subject to review.73 The Washington stat-
ute74 on competency fits the strictest category ("every person is
competent who is capable of being understood by the jury and un-
derstands the obligation to tell the truth"). It would be reasonable
to presume that this standard influenced the prosecutor's decision
not to produce the children for the competency hearing.
B. Procedural Issues
1. THE VOIR DIRE
Some of the procedural issues raised by the competency re-
quirement arise in relation to voir dire. It is generally accepted
that the date of competency or incompetency of a witness is fixed
when the witness is offered, and not when the facts, which were
testified to, occurred.7 5 Thus, one appellate court found that the
lower court abused its discretion in finding a witness competent,
71. Ryan, 103 Wash. 2d at - 691 P.2d at 203.
72. Ryan, 103 Wash. 2d at , 691 P.2d at 203. See also State v. Campbell, 299 Or.
633, 705 P.2d 694 (1985) (Confrontation principles require, as a precondition for admission
of' hearsay evidence, that the trial court ascertain for Itself that the declarant is in fact
unavailable.). But see State v. Myatt, 237 Kan. 17, , 697 P.2d 836, 843 (1985) ("The
first prong of the Roberts test for admissibility of out-of-court statements of a witness who
does not testify is whether that witness is unavailable. In this case, both parties stipulated
at trial the child was disqualified as a witnem. Therefore, the first prong of Roberts was
satisfied." (emphasis added)).
73. Berliner & Barbieri, supra note 25, at 127, 130 (noting the heart of a sexual abuse
case is the child's testimony and prosecutors who fear that a child will not convince the jury
are often reluctant to prosecute criminal child sexual abuse cases).
74. WAsn. Rzv. Come AN. J 5.60.050 (1963).
75. Knab v. Alden's Irving Park, Inc., 49 IlL. App. 2d 371, 199 N.E.2d 815 (1964). Ac-
cord State v. McIntosh, 10 FLW 2110 (Fla. 4th DCA Sept. 11, 1985) (trial court can make
de novo determination of child's competency at trial depite finding of incompetency at the
pretrial hearing); State v. Butcher, 270 S.E.2d 156 (W. Va. 1980); see also supra note 68.
But see Comment, supra note 23, at 105:
Of course, in all cases the court should be satisfied that the child was com-
petent as a witness at the time the incident litigated took place. Thus it is
clearly insufficient as a showing of competence that an eight year old child can
testfy accurately to contemporaneous happenings when the matter involved hap-
pened several years previously.
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but the reviewing court stated explicitly that on remand the trial
court could find the child competent."6 Typically, the judge con-
ducts a voir dire outside the presence of the jury at which time the
child is questioned in an effort to determine the competency of the
child to testify at the time of trial." The judge usually limits the
questions to issues unrelated to the trial controversy: "What is
your name?" "Where do you go to school?" "How old are you?"




76. Where an appeal takes time, the child grows and develops during that time period,
thus increasing the likelihood the court will find the child competent at a retrial. Pace v.
State, 157 Ga. App. 442, 278 S.E.2d 90 (1981). The court said:
The record in the present case shows that the child was eight years of age
when the trial was had, and it is probable that on another trial she may appear
to have sufficient intelligence and to have been the subject of such training as to
understand the responsibilities attaching to a witness in a case where human life
is involved.
Id. at 443, 278 S.E.2d at 92.
77. Comment, supra note 4, at 1378. But see State v. Brigandi, 186 Conn. 521, 534, 442
A.2d 927, 934 (1982) ("In Connecticut, the examination to determine the competency of a
witness is usually conducted by counsel under direction of the court, except insofar as the
court may find it advisable to intervene."). Of course, with Connecticut's newly enacted
statute, the child victim of assault, sexual assault, or abuse is deemed competent without
prior qualification. See Testimony of Victims of Child Abuse, Pub. Act 85-587 § 2, 1985
Conn. Legis. Serv. 465 (West).
78. Pace v. State, 157 Ga. App. 442, 443, 278 S.E.2d 90, 91 (1981); Stafford, supra note
23, at 312; Note, The Competency of Children as Witnesses, 39 VA. L. REv. 358, 362 (1953);
Comment, supra note 4, at 1382. The questions asked of the child need not, and should not
be complicated or tricky. In practice, the questions asked are simple and direct. The follow-
ing are examples of questions actually asked:
Q.... If I were to say that I'm wearing a red jacket, would that be a lie or would that
be the truth?
A. A lie.
Q. And why would it be a lie?
A. Because you're wearing a brown jacket.




A. Because you're wearing a tan shirt.
In re A.H.B., 491 A.2d 490, 493 (D.C. 1985) (two child robbery victims competent to testify)
(omissions in original).
Q. Now, why don't you tell the Judge your name.
A. J.K.G.
Q.... And how old are you?
A. Five.
Q. Okay. Now do you know the difference between telling the truth and not telling the
truth?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. If you were here like you are, and you told the Judge who's sitting up
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Generally it is the judge who presents the questions to the
child during voir dire. In State v. Weisenstein,7  the defendant
contended that the trial court erred in refusing to allow him to
examine the child sexual abuse victim during the competency
hearing and in refusing to allow his attorney to present the five-
year-old with a hypothetical fact pattern testing the child's ability
to observe, recollect, communicate, and express an understanding
of moral distinctions.8 0 The Weisenstein court held that under the
South Dakota rules of evidence, the trial judge was responsible for
determining the competency of the witness and that the judge did
not abuse his discretion."1
Another procedural issue raised by the competency require-
ment concerns who may testify at the voir dire. The Supreme
there-do you see the Judge up there? Alright [sic], you told the Judge I was wearing a
bright red suit, okay, today that I was wearing a bright red suit, would that be the truth or
would that be not the truth?
A. It would not.
Q. Okay, because I'm not wearing a red suit am I?
A. No.
Q. Do you understand that you have to tell the truth when you are asked questions
when you sit in the witness chair?
A. (no response)
Q. Do you understand that?
A. Yes.
Q. And do you intend on, only telling the Judge the truth?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.
Q. Josie, do you know what the difference is between telling the truth and a lie?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you know what happens to people that tell lies?
A. No.
Jones v. State, - Ind. .-- , 464 N.E2d 1283, 1284-85 (1984) (five-year-old child
victim of sexual abuse competent to testify) (omissions in original).
During voir dire, if the judge inquires into the substance of the child's testimony in
court, the defendant's sixth amendment right to confrontation may be affected. Comment,
supra note 4, at 1391-92. Although not always, some judges refuse to allow the defendant to
be present while the judge conducts voir dire. See, e.g., Moll v. State, 351 N.W.2d 639
(Minn. App. Ct. 1984). For cases concluding there was no violation of defendant's confronta-
tion rights, see State v. Ritchy, 107 Ariz. 652, 490 P.2d 558 (1971); People v. Breitweiser, 38
IM. App. 3d 1066, 349 N.E.2d 454 (1976); Moll v. State, 351 N.W.2d 639 (Minn. App. Ct.
1984); State v. Taylor, 704 P.2d 443 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985). See also Comment, supra note 4,
at 1391.
Idaho recently amended its competency statute to statutorily mandate the defendant's
right to be present during voir dire. IDAHO CODE § 9-202 (1985) (amended by 1985 Idaho
Seas. Laws ch. 215, § 1, at 524).
79. - S.D. , 367 N.W.2d 201 (1985).
80. Id. at -, 367 N.W.2d at 204.
81. Id. at -, 367 N.W.2d at 205.
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Court of West Virginia, in Burdette v. Lobban,a2 indicated that use
of a neutral expert witness could be helpful in determining the
competency of a child sexual assault victim when the child is testi-
fying against one of its parents.83 The problem with allowing an
expert witness to make such a determination is the likelihood that
for each expert that finds the child competent, there will be an-
other who finds the child incompetent. It would be preferable
that judges use competency standards not requiring the use of an
expert. For example, a judge could determine, without expert help,
whether a child can understand the difference between truth and
falsity by the child's response to a question: "If I told you I was
your father, would I be telling the truth?"
Addressing another issue, some authorities have held that the
competency examination should take place in the presence of the
jury.8  They contend that the child's understanding of the nature
of the oath and his capacity to comprehend the distinction be-
tween right and wrong, as disclosed by his preliminary hearing, are
proper matters to be considered in determining the weight to be
given to the testimony by the trier of fact.8" This approach is simi-
lar to the stand taken in states which have eliminated the compe-
tency requirement for child victims of sexual abuse.87 In those
states, the jurors listen to the child and determine for themselves
whether the child's testimony is credible.
Courts do not always require a formal competency hearing. In
People v. Garcia,88 the trial court did not conduct a formal compe-
tency hearing, but did ask the ten-year-old sexual abuse victim
certain questions about her age, name, school, and about the dif-
ference between telling a lie and telling the truth.8 ' On appeal, the
Supreme Court of Illinois held that "[t]here is no rigid formula
which is applicable to a determination of competency, and the rec-
ord reflects that the trial court was satisfied by [the victim's] re-
sponses to his questions that she was competent to testify."'90
82. Burdette v. Lobann, 323 S.E.2d 601 (W. Va. 1984).
83. Id. at 603.
84. See, e.g., Roe, supra p. 95 (Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 40 U.
MIAMI L REv. 97 (1985)).
85. For a discussion of the position that the competency hearing should take place
before the jury, see Stafford, supra note 23, at 312.
86. Id.
87. See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
88. 97 Il. 2d 58, 454 N.E.2d 274 (1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3555 (1984).
89. Id. at 74-75, 454 N.E.2d at 280.
90. Id. at 75, 454 N.E.2d at 280.
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2. THE OATH
a. Jurisdictions Not Patterned After the Federal Rule
Statutory provisions also influence the type of questions the
judge asks. In jurisdictions which require only that the child un-
derstand the obligation of an oath,"1 the judge concentrates on in-
quiries into the child's understanding of the concept of truth.
Some states specifically require that the court itself be satisfied
that the child understands the obligation to testify truthfully
under oath."' Courts in states which follow the 1953 Uniform Rules
of Evidence" also inquire into the child's understanding of truth.
In the past, a child (or adult) who did not have sufficient reli-
gious training could not take the oath and therefore would be
barred from testifying. 4 The premise was that unless a witness be-
lieved in heavenly reprisal for false statement, he or she could not
be trusted to speak the truth.98 Typically, a general course of reli-
gious studies was required; the religious instruction could not be
given exclusively for the purpose of trial." Not surprisingly, this
approach has changed."
Usually, the child need not understand the legal nature of the
oath or the formality of taking the oath, as long as the child has an
"adequate sense of the impropriety of falsehood."'8 Florida's stat-
ute provides this standard: "In the court's discretion, a child may
testify without taking the oath if the court determines the child
understands the duty to tell the truth, or the child understands
the duty not to lie.""
91. See eupra notes 36-37.
92. See, e.g., L Rzv. STAT. ANN. § 15-469 (West 1981); Mica R EVID. 601; N.Y. CRI.
Psoc. LAw 1 60.20 (ConsoL 1979).
93. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
94. Goodman, supra note 8, at 13.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Compare State v. Green, 267 S.C. 599, 606, 230 S.E.2d 618, 621 (1976) ("lIt is not
essential that a challenged witness state a belief in God or His providence before being
allowed to testify.") with State v. Abercrombie, 130 S.C. 358, 126 S.E. 142 (1925) (eight-
year-old incompetent to testify because he stated he had never heard of God).
98. Stafford, supra note 23, at 318. Accord State v. Smith, 679 S.W.2d 899, 901 (Mo.
App. 1984) (citing State v. Smith, 641 S.W.2d 463, 466 (Mo. App. 1982)) ("For an infant to
be competent to testify, he need not know the meaning of an oath as long as he understands
the difference between truth and falsity.").
99. Judicial Proceedings Involving Children, ch. 85-53, § 3, 1985 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.
122, 125 (West) (to be codified at FL& STAT. § 90.605(2)). The italized portion was recently
added. Id. The purpose of this adjustment to the oath requirement is readily apparent when
one considers the possiblity that children are frequently taught to believe in fictional char-
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New York, an oath jurisdiction, requires that the court itself
find that witnesses under twelve understand the nature of an
oath.' The statute, however, provides alternatives. If the court is
acters such as Santa Claus and the Easter Bunny. Technically, if a child believes that Santa
Claus exists, then the child lacks an understanding of the difference between truth and
falsity. When asked if Santa Claus is real, a child who answers "yes" may nevertheless un-
derstand a duty not to lie. But a child can still understand the obligation to tell the truth,
even if the child believes in a false idea. Inquiries along these lines are more properly made
on cross-examination and should affect the credibility of the child's testimony and not the
competency of the child to testify in the first place. Professor Michael H. Graham suggests
that this amendment is unwise:
Recommendations have been made to permit a child to testify without taking an
oath or giving an affirmation that he or she will testify truthfully, See FED. R
EVID. 603. The apparent purpose of the recommendation is to avoid a judicial
determination of whether the child knows the difference between the truth and a
lie or fantasy. Query: Should a witness who understands the difference between
the truth and a lie or fantasy be permitted to testify if the witness doesn't also
understand the obligation to tell the truth? A "No" answer is suggested . . . If
the child understands the duty to tell the truth, the child can most certainly
take an oath or give an affirmation. Moreover, the court has to decide whether
the child knows the difference between the truth and a lie as part of the process
of determining whether the child understands the duty to tell the truth or not to
lie. The wisdom of the Florida statute is certainly subject to challenge.
Graham, supra note 28, at 76 n. 131.
Additionally, some courts have held that the child need not know the consequences of
lying. In Hill v. State, the Supreme Court of Georgia held that it was "not necessary that a
child demonstrate his knowledge of the penalties for perjury in order for the trial court to
rule him competent to testify." 251 Ga. 430, 431, 306 S.E.2d 653, 654 (1983). Accord State v.
Rodriquez, 180 Conn. 382, 429 A.2d 919 (1980) (child need not be aware of sanctions for
perjury as the consequence of not telling the truth). This is particularly relevant because, in
the past, defendants have raised the defense that because criminal perjury statutes do not
apply to children under certain age limits, children should not be competent to give sworn
testimony. See Note, supra note 78, at 368-69. This argument becomes moot if the child
need not know the consequences of perjury.
100. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 60.20.2 (Consol. 1979). The wording of the New York stat-
ute after its amendment in 1975 is less than clear. Prior to 1975, the statute read:
A child less than twelve years old may not testify under oath unless the court is
satisfied that he understands the nature of the oath. If the court is not so satis-
fied, such child may never the less be permitted to give unsworn evidence if the
court is satisfied that he possesses sufficient intelligence and capacity to justify
the reception thereof.
Act of May 20, 1970, ch. 996, 1970 N.Y. Laws 3117, 3137. In 1975, the legislature amended
the statute to permit witnesses over the age of twelve to testify if they were suffering from a
mental disease or defect, provided that the judge was satisfied that the witness possessed
sufficient intelligence and capacity to justify the reception:
A child less than twelve years old may not testify under oath unless the court is
satisfied that he understands the nature of the oath. If the court is not so satis.
fied, such child or such witness over the age of twelve years old who cannot, as
a result of mental disease or defect, understand the nature of an oath may
nevertheless be permitted to give unsworn evidence if the court is satisfied that
the witness possesses sufficient intelligence and capacity to justify the reception
thereof.
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not satisfied that the child under twelve understands the nature of
the oath, but nevertheless wants to permit the child to testify, the
court can allow the child to give unsworn evidence if the court is
satisfied that the child possesses sufficient intelligence and capac-
ity to justify the admission.101 The statute also provides an impor-
tant safeguard-the "defendant may not be convicted of an offense
solely upon unsworn evidence."103 New York's approach to the
oath requirement is a model for those states which require that the
judge personally be satisfied that the child understands the obliga-
tion of the oath. The New York approach, however, is not needed
in jurisdictions which follow the federal rules approach for reasons
noted in the next section.
Understanding the difference between truth and falsity can be
a philosophical problem. In practice, the judge may ask the child a
question such as "Jenny, if I told someone your name was Mary,
would I be telling the truth?" The child would probably answer
"no" and the judge would then find her able to understand the
difference between truth and falsity. Next, the judge might ask the
child to affirm that she would tell only the truth in the courtroom.
Not all judges, however, will ask such simple questions. There is
much room for discrepancy. To compensate for the discrepancy, if
the judge finds the child does not understand the obligation of the
oath, the child should be allowed to testify anyway without being
sworn in, provided the judge finds the child can record, recollect,
and narrate.
The judge should tell the jury that the child has not been
sworn in, a factor the jury should consider in assessing the credibil-
ity of the child. The court should make reference to this fact in the
jury instructions, but should not overemphasize it. The instruction
might state that because of the child's lack of development, the
court has determined the child may not give sworn testimony, but
the jury is free to attach whatever weight it deems appropriate to
the child's unsworn testimony.
Act of June 3, 1975, ch. 133, N.Y. Laws I 181 (McKinney 197§). With the amendment, the
statute may appear to restrict unsworn testimony to children over twelve who because of
mental defect or disease cannot understand the obligation of the oath. The history of the
statute and the fact that courts have allowed children under twelve to give unsworn testi.
mony militates against that interpretation. See, e.g., People v. St. John, 74 A.D.2d 85, 426
N.Y.2d 863 (1980) (no abuse of discretion for allowing six and nine-year-old to give unsworn
testimony).
101. N.Y. CmiiL Paoc. LAW § 60.20.2 (Consol. 1979).
102. Id. at § 60.20.3.
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b. Jurisdictions Patterned After the Federal Rule
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the oath requirement
should be treated completely differently than it is treated when a
particular state statute requires the court itself to believe the child
is competent. Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 603 provides that a
witness must make an affirmation prior to testifying that he will
testify truthfully.103 The advisory committee's notes state that an
"[a]ffirmation is simply a solemn undertaking to tell the truth; no
special verbal formula is required. . . . 'Oath' includes affirmation.
• . ."104 As set forth in the rule, and in the advisory committee
note, Rule 603 requires only a mechanical act, not an indepth de-
termination that a witness understands the difference between
truth and falsity. 10 The judge's inquiry should be based on rele-
vancy and only marginally on moral qualifications.0 6 The judge
should only reject the testimony if the judge is convinced the testi-
mony has no probative value and is therefore inadmissible for lack
of relevancy.10 7 Thus, the focus of the judge's inquiry under Fed-
eral Rules 401 and 403 should be whether the child's testimony
should be admitted as "having any tendency to make the existence
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the ac-
tion more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence."'' "All that Rule 401 requires is minimal logical rele-
vancy; the item of evidence need not, by itself, persuade the trier
of fact, or be sufficient to persuade the trier of fact, that the fact to
be inferred is more probably true than not true."'0 9 Therefore, in
jurisdictions which are patterned after the federal rules, the judge
103. FED. R. EvID. 603. Rule 603 states: "Before testifying, every witness shall be re-
quired to declare that he will testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered in a
form calculated to awaken his conscience and impress his mind with his duty to do so." Id.
104. FED. R. EVID. 603 advisory committee note. (citing 1 U.S.C. § 1 (1982 current ver-
sion) for the proposition that oath includes affirmation).
105. According to Professor Michael H. Graham:
Neither Rule 603 or 601 imposes any requirement of moral capacity in the sense
of requiring that the witness actually possess a sense of responsibility to speak
the truth. Similarly no requirement of belief in God is imposed. Rule 603 adopts
the position that "[t]he true purpose of the oath is not to exclude any competent
witness, but merely to add a stimulus to truthfulness where ever such a stimulus
is feasible."
M. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 603.1, at 390-91 (1981) (citing 6 J. WIOMomw
EVIDENCE § 1827, at 413-14 (Chadbourn rev. 1976)).
106. 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE § 603[01] (1985).
107. Id.
108. FED. R EvID. 401
109. M. GRAHAM, supra note 19, at 11.
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should only reject a child's testimony if he finds that no reasonable
juror could possibly believe the child capable of telling the truth.
The judge need not personally believe the child capable of telling
the truth.
Usually, a witness must give the affirmation prior to testify-
ing.110 In at least one case, however, the court held that no formal
oath or affirmation was needed prior to testifying. In Larsen v.
State,"' before testifying, the court questioned the five-year-old
victim of sexual abuse concerning his understanding of truth and
his perception of the punishment incurred for lying. The court did
not, however, administer a formal oath. After testifying, the child
was asked whether he had promised to tell the truth and if he had
in fact told the truth."" The court noted that technically the affir-
mation should have occurred before testimony, but that the child's
pretestimony affirmation of his understanding of telling the truth
satisfied Wyoming's requirement of an oath or affirmation before
testifying.'"
3. TIMING OF OBJECTIONS
Parties frequently contest the issue of when a defendant must
object to the child's competency. The disposition of this issue de-
pends on the particular statute involved. On one hand are the
states that have an "every person is competent who can under-
stand the oath" statute or an "every person is competent who is
capable of being understood by the jury and understands the obli-
gation to tell the truth" statute, where some of the statutes are
triggered at a specific age. '4 In State v. Schossow," s the Supreme
Court of Arizona interpreted the statute as creating a presumption
of incompetency for children under the age of ten that could be
overcome only by an actual hearing."' In Schossow, the court held
that the statute made a competency hearing mandatory."1
On the other hand, Wyoming,1' Wisconsin,"' and North Car-
110. See, eg., F. R Evm. 603.
111. 686 P.2d 583 (Wyo. 1984).
112. Id. at 587.
113. Id.
114. See supra notes 36 and 42.
l15 - Ariz.-_ ,703 P.2d 448 (1985).
116. Id. at___-, 703 P.2d at 449.
117. Id. at...._. 703 P.2d at 451. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Arizona held the
trial court's failure to conduct a hearing was nonprejudicial error in the absence of any
indication of incompetency in the record. Id. at....._. 703 P.2d at 452.
118. Wvo. R Evm. 601.
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olina,'20 are "every person is competent except as provided other-
wise" jurisdictions which are not triggered by age. In these states,
courts have held that if the defendant fails to object to the compe-
tency of the child witness at trial, he waives the objection.12 1 In
State v. Robinson,12 2 the Supreme Court of North Carolina noted
that a properly made objection at trial would allow the trial judge
to correct any failure to administer the oath or swear in the wit-
ness. Citing an 1885 case, the court stated that "it would be detri-
mental to public justice to allow a defendant to remain silent,
awaiting the chances of acquittal, and, if disappointed in the re-
sult, fall back upon a reserved objection.' 23 The North Carolina
court's reasoning seems to be the most practical, even for those
jurisdictions which have age-triggered statutes.
4. PROCEDURE ON REVIEW
The combination of the statutory scheme and appellate review
methods can create additional problems under the competency re-
quirement. Many states hold that upon review of the competency
determination, the appellate court may review all of the child's tes-
timony to determine its competency, not just the voir dire testi-
mony. 24 This is an improper standard of review. Indisputably, the
trial judge's decision must be given great deference and should
only be overturned upon a clear showing of abuse of discretion.""'
119. WIs. STAT. § 906.01 (1975).
120. N.C. R. EvmD. 601.
121. State v. Robinson, 310 N.C. 530, 540, 313 S.E.2d 571, 578 (1984) (failure to raise an
objection to the fact the witness was not sworn in); Love v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 432, 439, 219
N.W.2d 294, 298 (1974); Larsen v. State, 686 P.2d 583, 587 (Wyo. 1984). See also Peyton v.
Strickland, 262 S.C. 210, 203 S.E.2d 388 (1974) (failure to object to competency of eight-
year-old at trial waived right to object).
122. State v. Robinson, 310 N.C. 530, 540, 313 S.E.2d 571, 578 (1984).
123. Id. (citing State v. Gee, 92 N.C. 756 (1885)).
124. Pace v. State, 157 Ga. App. 442, 278 S.E.2d 90 (1981); State v. Smith, 679 S.W.2d
899, 901 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (citing State v. Gibson, 623 S.W.2d 93, 98 (Mo. Ct. App.
1981)); Lanoue v. State, 99 Nev. 305, 307, 661 P.2d 874, 874 (1983); Stafford, supra note 23,
at 308 n.39 (citing State v. Smith, 3 Wash. 2d 543, 101 P.2d 298 (1940); Macale v. Lynch,
110 Wash. 444, 188 P. 517 (1920); State v. Bailey, 31 Wash. 89, 71 P. 715 (1903)); Comment,
supra note 23, at 102-03 nn.30-31 (citing Yother v. State, 167 Ark. 492, 268 S.W. 861 (1925);
Warner v. State, 25 Ark. 447 (1869); People v. Morcumb, 28 Cal. App. 2d 465, 82 P.2d 714
(1938); State v. Smith, 261 S.W.2d 50 (Mo. 1953)).
125. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. A justification for reviewing the entire
record is evident in State v. Dagget, 280 S.E.2d 545 (W. Vs. 1981). In Dagget, the court
indicated that it was the trial judge's duty to evaluate the infant's testimony before the jury
and to strike the testimony if the child appears to become incompetent. Id. at 555. Such an
approach confuses the characteristics of testimony that should go only to the credibility of
the witness with characteristics of testimony that should go to the competency of the wit-
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It would be illogical to allow the appellate court to review the trial
judge's determination based on facts and testimony not before the
judge when the judge made the competency decision. Once a find-
ing of competency has been made, any further inconsistencies or
vague replies should affect only the assessment of the credibility of
the witness. In People v. Edgar,2 the Michigan Court of Appeals
supported this proposition in an analogous situation. In Edgar, at
a preliminary hearing, the magistrate found a four-year-old compe-
tent to testify.27 At the subsequent trial, the trial judge found that
the child was incompetent and refused to allow the child to tes-
tify." The court of appeals held that onice a court determines ihe
child is competent, any future indication that the child is unable to
testify truthfully should reflect on the child's credibility and not
on the child's competency:
Although the change in the child's competency may seem incon-
gruous on its face, her subsequent inability to testify does not
alter the magistrate's initial finding. We find that the trial court
erred in reversing the magistrate's determination that Caprice
was competent to testify.... A subsequent showing of the wit-
ness's inability to testify truthfully affects credibilitly, not
admissibilty 2'e
The same reasoning should apply when the issue is the
breadth of review by the appellate court. Once the trial judge has
made the initial determination of competency, the ruling should
stand unless the reviewing court can determine that based on the
voir dire testimony alone, there was an abuse of discretion. It
would seem clear that if a trial court's inquiry into a child's under-
standing of the obligation of the oath is insufficient it could serve
as grounds for reversal. That should not be the case if, on the wit-
ness stand, the child indicates an inability to distinguish truth
from falsity. Inconsistency has traditionally affected credibility,
nero. Once the court finds the child is competent, the child's subsequent inability to testify
truthfully or coherently should affect only the credibility of the witness. The opposing coun-
sel often tries to intimidate the child witness in order to discredit the witness. As a result of
intimidation, the child is likely to become sullen and uncommunicative on the stand. At this
point, the court should recess to allow the child to talk with his parents and compose him-
self before continuing to give testimony.
126. 113 Mich. App. 628, 317 N.W.2d 675 (1982).
127. Id. at 531, 317 N.W.2d at 677.
128. Id. at 632, 317 N.W.2d at 677.
129. Id. at 635, 317 N.W.2d at 678 (citing People v. Cobb, 108 Mich. App. 573, 576, 310




Recently, in Jones v. State,3 the Supreme Court of Indiana
approved the proposition that the reviewing court should be con-
fined tothe voir dire testimony. In Jones, a father sexually abused
his five-year-old daughter."3 ' After the trial court declared the
child competent, the defendant renewed his objection to her com-
petency "on the grounds that her testimony was confused and re-
hearsed." 13 8 The Supreme Court of Indiana held that after the trial
court has ruled on the competency of a child witness, the questions
asked "cannot be used to undermine the ruling of competency. '1 3'
It held that such questions go to the credibility of the witness and
should influence the weight given to the child's testimony by the
trier of fact.
35
V. LEGISLATIVE TRENDS IN THE LAW
Several states'36 have enacted statutes which deem child vic-
tims of sexual abuse competent by law. The recently enacted Con-
necticut statute is typical of these statutes. 3 7 It deems all child
victims of assault, abuse, and sexual abuse competent to testify:
No witness shall be automatically adjudged incompetent to tes-
tify because of age and any child who is a victim of assault, sex-
ual assault or abuse shall be competent to testify without prior
qualification. The weight to be given the evidence and the credi-
130. See, e.g., State v. Garner, 116 Ariz. 443, 569 P.2d 1341 (1977) (inconsistencies in
victim's testimony and his inability to place the events in question into a specific timeframe
goes to the credibility of the testimony and not to competency); State v. McKenney, 101
Idaho 149, 150-51, 609 P.2d 1140, 1141-42 (1980) (trial court's decision that a nine-year-old's
indecisiveness went to the weight as opposed to admissibility of testimony was not in error);
State v. Emery, 434 A.2d 51, 52 (Me. 1981) (nine-year-old's "change of testimony on cross-
examination would relate to credibility rather than to competency").
131. _ nd.., 464 N.E.2d 1283 (1984).
132. Id. at -, 464 N.E.2d at 1284.
133. Id. at 464 N.E.2d at 1285.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Colorado, Missouri, Connecticut, and Utah have special competency statutes for
child abuse victims: Colorado: CoLo. Rgv. STAT. 1 13-90-106 (1973) (deeming victims of
child abuse under age of ten competent); Testimony of Victims of Child Abuse, Pub. Act 85-
587, § 2, 1985 Conn. Legis. Serv. 463 (West) (deeming all victims of child abuse competent);
Missouri: 33 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.060 (Vernon Supp. 1985) (deeming child victims of
certain sex crimes competent by law who do not "appear incapable of receiving just impres-
sions... " even though the victims are under ten years old); Utah. UTAH CODE ANN. J 76-
5-410 (Supp. 1985) (deeming child victims of certain sex crimes competent by law if under
ten years old).
137. Testimony of Victims of Child Abuse, Pub. Act 85-587, § 2, 1985 Conn. Legis.
Serv. 463 (West).
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bility of the witness shall be for the determination of the trier of
fact.,"
Connecticut is a common law jurisdiction which does not have a
general competency statute. "
Colorado, Missouri, and Utah all have statutes that fall within
the "everyone is competent who is capable of being understood by
the jury and understands the obligation to tell the truth" cate-
gory. 1'40 They are, arguably, the strictest jurisdictions. Recent
amendments which deem child victims competent by law could in-
dicate that legislatures are are finding the comprehensive require-
ments overinclusive. Legislators may believe that the comprehen-
sive statutes create problems in prosecuting child sexual abuse
cases. On the other hand, Idaho, which is also in an "everyone is
competent who is capable of being understood by the jury and un-
derstands the obligation to tell the truth" jurisdiction, recently
amended its statute to be more specific. 14 Idaho added the follow-
ing directions for the judge conducting the voir dire:
At the time a child under the age of ten (10) years of age is
called to testify in any court proceeding, the court shall conduct
a hearing in chambers to determine whether the child qualifies
as a witness under this section. In conducting such hearing the
court shall take every reasonable means necessary to prevent in-
timidation or harassment of the child by the parties or their at-
torneys. The judge, rather than the parties, shall examine the
child but he shall do so in the presence of the parties and he
shall pose to the child any reasonable questions requested by
the parties and previously submitted to the court. The judge
may rephrase any questions so that the child is not
intimidated."'
The history of legislation in Minnesota reinforces the percep-
tion that not all states solve the competency problem by allowing
children to testify without a predetermination of competency.
Minnesota is an "everyone is competent who is capable of being
understood by the jury and understands the obligation to tell the
truth" jurisdiction. In 1981, it amended its competency statute so
138. Id.
139. See supra note 31.
140. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
141. IDAHO CODs § 9-202 (1985) (amended by 1985 Idaho Ses. Law, ch. 215, § 1). See
atio Victim and Witness Protection Act, H.F. 462, § 16, 1985 Iowa Legis. Serv. 108, 114
(West) (setting forth explicit requirementa for competency hearings).
142. Victim and Witness Protection Act, H.F. 462, § 16, 1985 Iowa Legis. Serv. 108, 114.
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that it did not apply to children under ten in criminal proceedings
for intrafamilial sex abuse and other sex crimes." 8 In 1984, how-
ever, the Minnesota Legislature again amended the statute which
totally changed the thrust of the statute. Instead of rejecting the
competency requirement for children under ten, as it originally
did, the statute merely allowed a child to use language appropriate
for a child of that age when describing the sexual contact.1 44 The
few cases that were decided under the 1981 statute do not give any
clue to the motivation behind the 1984 amendment. The cases do,
however, interpret the statute in a way that limits its application
to children who can pass a competency "test."
The Minnesota Supreme Court applied the 1981 statute in
State v. Cermak. 45 The defendant was charged with thirty counts
of criminal sexual conduct. 46 At trial, the court permitted three
child victims ages ten, six, and five, to testify.147 The defendant
argued that the children failed to satisfy at least one of two Minne-
sota competency requirements."6 The court interpreted the 1981
statute as meaning that the "presumption of incompetency for
children under the age of ten was inapplicable to victim testimony
in cases of criminal sexual abuse so long as the child can 'describe
or relate, in language appropriate for a child of that age, the events
or facts respecting which the child is examined.' ""
The court reviewed the in camera record of the competency
143. Act of May 28, 1981, ch. 273, § 3, 1981 Minn. Laws 1236:
This exception [to the general rule that everyone is competent to testify)
does not apply to a child under ten years of age, in a criminal proceeding for
intrafamilial sexual abuse as defined I section 7, subdivision 10, or in a criminal
proceeding under sections 609.342 clause (a) [first degree criminal sexual con-
duct), 609.343 clause (a) [second degree criminal sexual conduct], 609.344 clause
(a) [third degree criminal sexual conduct], or 609.345 clause (a) [fourth degree
criminal sexual conduct], who is able to describe or relate in language appropri-
ate for a child of that age the events or facts respecting which the child is ex-
amined ...
144. Act of April 26, 1984, ch. 588, § 4, 1984 Minn. Laws 1226 ("A child describing any
act of sexual contact or penetration performed on or with the child by another may use
language appropriate for a child of that age.") "This 1984 amendment has not changed com-
petency hearings in practice because judges have always accepted children's language from
children." Comment, supra note 4, at 1383 n.11.
145. - Minn.-., 350 N.W.2d 328 (1984).
146. Id. at -' 350 N.W.2d at 330.
147. Id. at -' 350 N.W.2d at 331.
148. Id. at -' 350 N.W.2d at 331-32. The competency test in Minnesota requires a
witness "to understand the obligation of taking an oath and to be capable of correctly nar-
rating the facts to which his or her testimony relates." Id. (citing State ex rel. Dugal v.
Tahas, 278 Minn. 175, 177-78, 153 N.W.2d 232, 234 (1967)).
149. Id. at __, 350 N.W.2d at 332 (citing MNN. STAT. § 595.02(6) (1982)).
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hearing and the trial testimony of the children and concluded that
the record sustained the trial court's determination that each child
(1) "understood the difference between truth and falsehood" and
(2) "could narrate effectively."1 0 Thus, despite the special statute,
the court, in effect, still used the general competency test to review
the trial court's decision. Without explicitly stating it was doing so,
the court treated the special statute as meaning there was no pre-
sumption of incompetency. Instead, the court only applied the gen-
eral competency standards once the child's lack of competency was
raised as an issue.
On April 26, 1984, approximately three weeks prior to the Cer-
mak decision, the Minnesota legislature amended its competency
statute.8 The Cermak court should not have been influenced by
the amendment because the abuse occurred prior to enactment,
and the amendment was prospective. Thus it would be possible,
but unlikely, that the court's treatment could have been influenced
by the Minnesota Legislature.
Three weeks after Cermak, in Moll v. State,163 the Minnesota
Court of Appeals applied the 1981 statute in a controversial man-
ner. In Moll, the defendant was accused of sexually abusing a four-
year-old-child and a six-year-old child.163 The court permitted
both children to testify.'" The court stated that the standard for
determining the competency of children followed the language of
the special statute:
[tihe standard of competency to be tested by the court for a
child witness under age ten in a sex abuse case is one "who is
able to describe or relate in language appropriate for a child of
that age the events or facts respecting which the child is
examined.""
The defendant in Moll argued that the trial judge committed
reversable error by failing to allow the defendant and his attorney
to be present during the preliminary determinations of compe-
tency. ' " The appellate court ultimately concluded that a criminal
defendant does not have the right to attend the in camera compe-
tency examination. The defendant's counsel, however, should be
160. Id.
151. See supra note 144.
152. - Minn. App....- 351 N.W.2d 639 (1984).
163. Id. at - 361 N.W.2d at 641.
154. Id. at - 351 N.W.2d at 642.
155. Id. at - 361 N.W.2d at 643 (citing MMN. STAT. § 595.02(6) (1982)).
156. Id. at - 361 N.W.2d at 641.
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permitted to attend unless the court finds counsel's presence likely
to intimidate the child or to hinder the child's ability to communi-
cate. 5 7 The concurring opinion raised questions about the chil-
dren's competency to testify based on the children's testimony
during direct and cross-examination:
The four-year-old witness, C.S., was completely led during
direct examination. Her testimony was self-contradictory at
best, and she stated several times that she didn't remember the
incident. On cross-examination, she denied defendant touched
her and stated "I don't remember none of this stuff." The six-
year-old, N.P., was more spontaneous on direct examination
than the four-year-old. On cross-examination, however, N.P.
stated she did not know what a lie was.... The children proba-
bly should not have been allowed to testify.'
Possibly the trial court's resolution of the competency issue in
this case spurred the Minnesota Legislature to amend the 1981
statute which appeared to exempt children under ten from the
competency requirements.
In November of 1984, after Moll, the Minnesota Supreme
Court reiterated its Cermak interpretation of the 1981 statute in
State v. Fader.159 In Fader, the court noted that the 1981 statute
set the rule of competency for child victims of sexual abuse, but
then ignored the statute and went on to review the lower court's
record to see if the five-year-old sexual abuse victim were compe-
tent under the general competency standard.16 0 Thus, despite the
explicit wording of the 1981 statute, which excluded children
under ten, the Supreme Court of Minnesota applied the general
competency standard: "She seemed to know the difference between
telling the truth and lying and seemed to be an intelligent child
capable of narrating adequately the facts."'
1
Minnesota recently modified its statute, but this interpreta-
157. Id. at -, 351 N.W.2d at 644-45.
158. Id. at , 351 N.W.2d at 646 (Popovich, J., concurring specially) (citations omit-
ted). All of the concerns Judge Popovich expressed should go only to the credibility of the
witnesses and not to their competency. It is the tendency to treat everything as affecting
competency rather than credibility that supports the conclusion, expressed earlier, that the
reviewing court should be limited to a review of the voir dire testimony alone and not the
in-court testimony. As noted earlier, the opposing counsel's goal on cross-examination will
always be to make the child appear inconsistent and questionable. Adult witnesses are not
held incompetent when they appear inconsistent on the stand because it is understood that
the trier of fact will take that into consideration.
159. - Minn.-, 358 N.W.2d 42 (1984).
160. Id. at -, 358 N.W.2d at 45; see supra note 148.
161. Minn. at - , 358 N.W.2d at 45.
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tion is not moot because other states have similiar statutes. Other
states may also interpret their statutes to create a rebuttable pre-
sumption of competency which means the court need not conduct
a competency hearing unless a defendant objects to the compe-
tency of a child witness during trial. If the defendant fails to raise
the issue at trial, he waives his right to question competency. The
trial court does not have a duty to raise the issue on its own. Once
the issue is raised, however, the judge must conduct a competency
hearing to determine the competency of the witness.
VI. PROPOSALS FOR REFORMING THE COMPETENCY REQUIREMENT
Concern with the propriety of the current judicial determina-
tion of children's competency to testify is not a new issue. 162 In
Wigmore's 1940 treatise on evidence, ' " he suggested eliminating
any attempt to determine the competency of infants. Wigmore
concluded that the most sensible option for the judge was to put
the child on the stand regardless of whether the child was compe-
tent to testify. The jury would then be allowed to attach whatever
significance they saw fit to the child's testimony:
A rational view of the peculiarities of child-nature, and of
the daily course of justice in our courts, must lead to the conclu-
sion that the effort to measure 'a priori' the degrees of trustwor-
thiness in children's statements, and to distinguish the point at
which they cease to be totally incredible and acquire suddenly
some degree of credibility, is futile and unprofitable. The desira-
bility of abandoning this attempt and abolishing all grounds of
mental or moral incapacity has already been noted, in dealing
with mental derangement ... The reasons apply with equal or
greater force to the testimony of children. Recognizing on the
one hand the childish disposition to weave romances and to
treat imagination for verity, and on the other hand the rooted
ingenuousness of children and their tendency to speak straight-
forwardly what is in their minds, it must be concluded that the
sensible way is to put the child upon the stand and let it tell its
162. See, e.g., Note, Evidence: Witnesses: Competency of Children of Tender Years, 18
CAmm,. L Rzv. 85, 86 (1929) ("The weakness of the test laid down by the court in [The King
v. Brasier, 168 Eng. Rep. 202 (1779)] ties in the proposition that the admissibility or exclu-
sion of the testimony turns upon the background of the individual judge."); Hutchins &
Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence-the Competency of Witnesses, 37
Yms LJ. 1017 (1928) (suggesting the use of the Binet test of intelligence as a means for
judges to determine the competency of young children).
163. J. WIGMOII, Evmzcs § 509 (1940).
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story for what it may seem to be worth.1
Various arguments can be set forth to support the Wigmore
approach. One can argue that unlike someone who is insane the
jury can recognize for itself the youth of the child and if the child
has trouble communicating the jury can take that into considera-
tion in determining the weight to accord the child's testimony.1 "5
This does not, however, address the reason for denial of admission
in the first place, the lack of relevancy. If the child's testimony is
irrelevant then there is a danger of misleading the jury when the
court admits the testimony.
Another argument is that disparate competency rulings in dif-
ferent states potentially create a situation where it is easier to
abuse children with impunity in one state than in another. This
argument could be refuted by noting that the resolution of this
problem need not be the total abolition of minimum requirements
of competency, rather, states should adopt the approach of the
Federal Rules of Evidence."' Parents make a similar argument,
charging that competency requirements encourage sex abusers to
victimize the very young child. This is a difficult argument to
counter, however, if the child can communicate the information to
a parent, the child should be able to communicate the information
to a jury. This of course does not provide a solution for the child
that lacks an understanding of the obligation to be truthful. Per-
haps, the New York approach would be instructive. New York per-
164. Id. at § 600-01. Although, no state has adopted the Wigmore approach for all situ-
ations, see In re Gerald, a Rhode Island case which appears to rely on Wigmore in finding a
five-year-old victim of sex abuse competent to testify. Rhode Island has a common law stan-
dard of competency. 1..R.L...., 471 A.2d 219, 221 (1984), See also supra notes 58-60 and
accompanying text.
165. For an argument that the jury can decide for itself if the witness is obviously in-
sane, see Judge Posner's opinion in United States v. Gutman, 725 F.2d 417, cert. denied, 105
S. Ct. 244 (1984). In discussing the testimony of an alleged mentally incompetent witness,
Judge Posner noted that the jury had been read psychiatric reports on the witness and
could decide for themselves the accuracy of the witness's testimony:.
[The jury] thus knew that [the witness] had a history of serious mental ill-
ness and that his latest hospitalization had occurred under bizarre circumstances
nine months before the trial. And that a mentally ill person may give testimony
that is false (though he may believe it to be true) is a possibility that a jury
should be capable of understanding and making appropriate allowances for.
[The defendant] argues, moreover, that [the witness's] testimony was "incoher-
ent." If so, the jury would have discounted it. If a lunatic takes the stand and
babbles gibberish, the jury will ignore it and the defendants will not be
harmed.
Id. at 420 (emphasis added).
166. See supra text accompanying note 29.
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mits the child to testify without being sworn in if the court is satis-
fied that the witness posseses sufficient intelligence and capacity to
justify admission. This rule should only be used in conjunction
with the New York requirement that the defendant not be con-
victed solely on unsworn testimony. If the jurisdiction follows the
federal rules, then the proper approach is for the judge to reject
the child's testimony only if he finds that no reasonable juror could
believe the child capable of telling the truth.'
7
Another argument is that under the current system, the prose-
cutors prep their young witnesses on the correct responses prior to
giving testimony. Thus, failure of the child to be competent may
only reflect poor preparation.'" If all prosecutors properly prepare
the witnesses, then this argument becomes moot, because only
truly incompetent children will not be found competent.
An alternative solution was utilized in a recent California case,
People v. Price.16 In Price, the defendant was arrested for sexually
abusing his four-year-old stepdaughter, but was released after be-
ing held for seventy-two hours and was told no charges were being
filed. 1 Ten months later, the prosecutor filed a complaint. At
trial, the prosecutor explained that she had delayed filing the com-
plaint "because of the immaturity of the victim at the time of the
offenses." 1 When the prosecutor first interviewed the child, the
child was very fidgety and had a very short attention span. The
prosecutor decided to reinterview the child after the child devel-
oped a longer attention span and a little more maturity, hoping
that the child would then remember what had occurred. 17 The de-
fendant argued that he had been denied his right to a speedy trial
in violation of the sixth amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion and of the California Constitution and also argued that he had
167. See supra notes 103-09 and accompanying text.
168. See, eg., Croteau, Child Victims of Sexual Abuse: Qualifying the Child Witness
Competent to Testify, 16:1 Tam Paoancutro 16 (1981). This article was written by an assis-
tant commonwealth attorney for Prince William County, Virginia. She said, "Remember,
the most important thing is to rehearse the competency questions before you go to court, so
the child will know what to expect and you will know what questions the child can answer."
Id. at 16 It is important to distinguish between coaching the child as to the exact responses
to make on the stand and preparing the witness for the questions the judge will ask in the
competency hearing. While coaching could improperly affect the child's ability to testify to
actual recollections, the preparation should only teach the child what a competency hearing
is like.
169. 165 Cal. App. 3d 536, 211 Cal. Rptr. 642 (1985).
170. Id. at 529, 211 CaL Rptr. at 644.
171. Id. at 39-40, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 644-45.
172. Id. at 540, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 645.
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been denied fourteenth amendment due process.7M The court re-
jected the sixth amendment argument noting that "[t]he provi-
sions of the Sixth Amendment contemplate a pending charge, not
the mere possibility of a criminal charge. 1' 7' To find a due process
violation, the court held, there must be a finding of actual
prejudice. Under the facts in the appeal, the defendant had not
shown actual prejudice.17 The defendant was not precluded, how-
ever, from trying to prove actual prejudice at trial. The court went
on to note that awaiting competence in this case presented a very
compelling reason for delay:
Delay to await the competence of a potential child witness
is not significantly different from a delay occasioned by the tem-
porary incompetence of an adult witness, whether due to physi-
cal or mental impairment. Were we to hold such delay prejudi-
cial, it would provide incentive to criminals to disable their
victims and to pedophiles to seek out the youngest and most
vulnerable victims. The constitution does not encourage such re-
sults in the name of due process.' "
The Price solution seems like a viable alternative, especially
when the child is at an age when a six month to one year delay will
make a great difference in the child's mental capacity. The prose-
cutor would have to weigh the danger of temporarily putting a po-
tential child abuser back on the street against the increased
probability of gaining a conviction. It seems more sensible to delay
the filing of formal charges while waiting for the child to become
competent, than to do away with all competency requirements.
To the advocates of special competency statues for abused
children, the Minnesota interpretation of its statute could seem
tragic.17 7 If other jurisdictions follow the Minnesota interpretation
of the special competency statutes for abused children as creating
only a presumption of competency, the interpretation could argua-
bly limit the effectiveness of the special statutes. Yet, the real
problems that result from application of the general competency
statutes are not readily apparent at the appellate level. The major-
ity of the cases which raise this issue merely rubber stamp the trial
judge's decision on competency.1 8 It is a rare case in which the
173. Id. at 539, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 644.
174. Id. at 541, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 645.
175. Id. at 542, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 646-47.
176. Id. at 544, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 648.
177. See supra notes 143-61 and accompanying text.
178. See, e.g., State v. Melendez, 135 ArA 390, 661 P.2d 654 (Ct. App. 1982) (trial
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trial judge is found to have abused his or her discretion. 179
Another potential problem arises in the application of compe-
tency statutes when the courts fail to properly distinguish between
characteristics of competency and characteristics of credibility. De-
fendants will attempt to argue on appeal that the child's perform-
ance on the witness stand demonstrates that the child was incom-
petent. The defendants will point to inconsistency, testimony
changes, reluctance to respond, reliance on a parent's or counsel's
guidance, indecisiveness, and inability to place incidents in a
proper time frame as establishing the child's incompetency. These
characteristics, however, are properly indicative of the child's cred-
ibility, not competency.1 80 The distinction between credibility and
court did not abuse its discretion in finding six-year-old sexual abuse victim competent to
testify); State v. Martin, 189 Conn. 1, 454 A.2d 256, cert. denied, 461 U.S. 933 (1983) (trial
court did not err in finding six-year-old victim competent to testify); State v. Brigandi, 186
Conn. 521, 442 A.2d 927 (1982) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding victim's
ten-year-old son competent to testify); In re A.H.B., 491 A.2d 490 (D.C. 1985) (trial court
did not err in finding eleven-year-old robbery victim competent to testify); Hill v. State, 251
Ga. 430, 306 S.E.2d 653 (1983) (tri.l court did not err in finding eleven-year-old murder
witness competent to testify); People v. Garcia, 97 Ill. 2d 58, 454 N.E.2d 274 (1983), cert.
denied, 104 S. CL 3555 (1984) (no abuse of discretion in finding eleven-year-old sexual
abuse victim competent to testify); People v. Marsh, 403 Ill 81, 85 N.E.2d 715, cert. denied,
338 U.S. 837 (1949) (no abuse of discretion to find six-year-old murder witness competent to
testify); Jones v. State, - Ind. , 464 N.E.2d 1283 (1984) (no abuse of discretion in
finding five-year-old sexual abuse victim competent to testify); State v. Foy, 439 So. 2d 433
(La. 1983) (trial court did not err in finding eight-year-old competent to testify); State v.
Pinkham, 411 A.2d 1021 (Me. 1980) (no abuse of discretion to find eight-year-old witness
competent to testify); People v. Edgar, 113 Mich. App. 528, 317 N.W.2d 675 (1982) (no
abuse of discretion in magistrates finding four-year-old competent to testify nor in the trial
court's subsequent finding of incompetence); State v. Cermak, - Minn. - , 350 N.W.2d
328 (1984) (trial court did not err in finding five, six, and ten-year-olds competent to tesi-
tify); State v. D.BS.,___ Mont ., 700 P.2d 630 (1985) (trial court did not err in finding
approximately four-year-old sexual abuse victim competent to testify); State v. Perkins, 121
N.H. 713, 435 A.2d 504 (1981) (trial court did not err in finding six-year-old competent to
testify); State v. Higginbottom, 312 N.C. 760, 324 S.E.2d 834 (1985) (trial court did not err
in finding four-year-old sexual abuse victim competent to testify); State v. Lambert, 276
S.C. 394, 279 S.E.2d 364 (1981) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding thirteen-
year-old sexual abuse victim competent to testify).
179. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
10. See, eg., State v. Garner, 116 Ariz. 443, 568 P.2d 1341 (1977) (nine-year-old victim
of sexual abuse, inconsistencies in victim's testimony, and his inability to place the events in
question into a specific time frame goes to the credibility of the testimony and not to com-
petency); State v. McKenney, 101 Idaho 149, 150-51, 609 P.2d 1140, 1141-42 (1980) ("The
testimony of this nine year old child reveals a fair measure of embarrassment and lack of
poise. With repect to the sequence of events her testimony was at times vague ... we can-
not say as a matter of law that the decision that the nine year old's indecisiveness went to
weight as opposed to admissibility was in error."); State v. Emery, 434 A.2d 51, 52 (Me.
1981) (Defendant contended that nine-year-old victim was incompetent because on cross
examination she supposedly changed her testimony. "Even if true, [the witness's] change of
testimony on cross examination would relate to credibility rather than competency."); Peo-
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competency is critical. Once the court finds the child competent,
the child's subsequent inability to testify perfectly should affect
only the credibility accorded to the testimony of the witness by the
trier of fact. The defendant's counsel often tries to intimidate the
young witness in an attempt to discredit the testimony. As a result
of intimidation, the child is likely to become sullen and uncommu-
nicative on the stand. To handle this the court should recess to
allow the child to talk with parents or counsel and to regain com-
posure before continuing to give testimony. Adult witnesses are not
held incompetent when they appear inconsistent on the stand be-
cause it is understood that the trier of fact will take that into
consideration.
Another example of the improper application of the compe-
tency statutes is the situation where the prosecutor decides to stip-
ulate to the child's incompetence without a hearing."' In that situ-
ation, the Price solution seems to be a better alternative. The
prosecutor should just wait for the child to become competent and
have the child qualify at a later date.
182
VII. CONCLUSION
The determination of a child's competency to testify can be
critical to the outcome of the trial. There are dangers inherent in
allowing a truly incompetent child to testify. It is hardly fair to the
defendant to have some unknown individual, so to speak, pulling
the strings of an incompetent witness. It is not necessary to totally
abandon competency requirements. It would be preferable for the
courts to properly apply the relevant competency criteria to each
and every witness, no matter how young, carefully distinguishing
pie v. Cobb, 108 Mich. App. 573, 575-76, 310 N.W.2d 798, 799 (1981) ("The court examined
the witness (who was of kindergarten age) and determined he was competent to testify not-
withstanding his reluctance to respond to some of the questions. From listening to all of the
boy's answers, the trial court ascertained to its own satisfaction that he would tell the truth.
... This comports with the requirements of MRE 601. A subsequent showing of the child's
inability to testify truthfully reflects on credibility, not competency."); State v. Higginbot-
tom, 312 N.C. 760, -, 324 S.E.2d 834, 839 (1985):
Although it is true that the child several times asked her mother questions
while testifying, those questions related to matters which were not pertinent to
the issues of the case and included such matters as what a "Smurf" was and
whether one of [the victim's] siblings was a stepsister or a real sister.. . . (wihile
this conduct may have been an appropriate subject for cross examination or a
jury argument, it in no-way alters [the victim's] competence as a witness.
181. See, e.g., State v. Myatt, 237 Kan. 17, -, 697 P.2d 836, 843 (1985); State v.
Ryan, 103 Wash. 2d 165, -, 691 P.2d 197, 203 (1984).
182. See supra notes 165-76 and accompanying text.
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between testimony that reflects on credibililty and testimony that
reflects on competency and to use unsworn testimony, with the
proper safeguards, when the child cannot understand the obliga-
tion of the oath. Children today are much brighter and receive ed-
ucation '" much earlier than children did when competency stat-
utes were first used. A Washington appellate opinion related the
following testimony of a three and one-half year old victim of sex-
ual abuse:
Q. How old are you, [B]?
A. Three and a half.
Q. Three and a half? When is your birthday?
A. June 19, 1979.
Q. What is your address?
A. 5722 Fickett Lane.
Q. Do you go to school at all?
A. Yeah.
Q. What type of school is it, or do you know?
A. PreschooL
Q. What are you learning in preschool?
A. Songs.
Q. Can you sing us a song here?
A. Yeah.
Q. Would you?
A. (Singing) "Three little monkeys jumping on a bed, one
fell off and bumped his head, Mama called the doctor and the
doctor said no more monkeys jumping on the bed."
When B.W. was brought back into the court in the presence
of the jury, she again gave her correct name, address, age,
birthdate, and, in addition, sang the same song and recited the
ABC's with four mistakes.1"
As the above excerpt indicates, it is fairly easy for even very young
children to demonstrate their competency. For this reason, if the
child is truly incompetent, we should not sanction admission of the
child's testimony, because that would be the same as putting a
puppet on the stand.
ROBIN W. MOREY*
183. In the past, public education for all ages was the exception not the rule. State v.
Hunsaker, 39 Wash. App. 489. 491 n.1, 693 P.2d 724, 725 n.1 (1985).
184. Id. at 492 n.2, 693 P.2d at 726 n.2.
0 The author would like to express appreciation to Professor Michael H. Graham for his
helpful criticism of this comment. Additionally, the author would like to recognize Manuel
Fernandez, for his assistance in researching state competency statutes. Finally, the author
would like to especially thank Thomas J. Morey for his unending assistance and support.
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